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WHEN SELLING YOUR PERSONAL NAME MARK 
    EXTENDS TO SELLING YOUR SOUL 
Yvette Joy Liebesman! 
Identifying one’s business with one’s personal name has long been a practice in 
the United States. As Personal Name Marks have become increasingly commodified, 
however, bargaining and deal-making have led to transfers of rights that are closely 
tied to the individual as a private person. This Article posits that, when selling the 
rights of one’s Personal Name Mark, freedom of contract doctrine should not allow the 
complete alienation of all aspects of one’s name, but rather there should be limitations 
on how far parties may bargain. In light of constitutional prohibitions, public policy 
concerns, administrative convenience, and other considerations, the most reasonable 
balance requires placing some limits on the extent to which one may bargain away the 
personal freedoms associated with one’s name.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Identifying oneself based on one’s occupation can be traced to the development of 
hereditary surnames.1 We no longer adopt surnames based on our occupations; rather 
we create businesses and attach hereditary or other names to the enterprise as a source 
indicator. With the growth of media and advertising, Personal Name Marks,2 like all 
marks, have been used to develop brand identity;3 their worth is dependent on the 
mark’s recognition and reputation among consumers.4 “If a brand is to be a source of 
value for an organisation, its positioning in the market and the minds of consumers will 
be critical to the actual value created.”5 And since a business’s name is usually 
 
1. See generally CHARLES WAREING BARDSLEY, ENGLISH SURNAMES: THEIR SOURCES AND 
SIGNIFICATIONS 1-8 (5th ed. 1897). The history of the use of names to indicate trade is discussed infra, Parts 
II.A and II.B. 
2. A Personal Name Mark can be defined as a “designation that is likely to be perceived by prospective 
purchasers . . . as the personal name of a person connected with the goods, services, or business” with which it 
is used. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 14 (1995). For further discussion, see infra notes 
100–03 and accompanying text. 
3. Tom Blackett, What Is a Brand?, in BRANDS AND BRANDING 13, 13 (Rita Clifton & John Simmons 
eds., 2004) (“[Brand] has always meant, in its passive form, the object by which an impression is formed, and 
in its active form the process of forming this impression . . . .”). Blackett notes that the Oxford American 
Dictionary defines Brand as “(noun): a trade mark, goods of a particular make: a mark of identification made 
with a hot iron, the iron used for this: a piece of burning or charred wood, (verb): to mark with a hot iron, or to 
label with a trade mark.” Id. (quoting OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 73 (1980)). 
4. Anne Bahr Thompson, Brand Positioning and Brand Creation, in BRANDS AND BRANDING, supra 
note 3, at 79, 79; see generally TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE (Lionel Bently 
et al. eds., 2008). 
5. Thompson, supra note 4, at 79. 
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essential to its goodwill,6 it is frequently one of the more valuable assets transferred 
when a company is sold.7 
Unlike other sources of marks,8 when a person’s name is also the name of her 
business or brand, there is a dual use.9 First, there is the name’s public use as a mark in 
commerce in connection with goods or services as an indicator of source or 
sponsorship,10 as well one’s right of publicity—and other forms of intellectual property 
associated with its use as a source designation—and one’s public actions related to the 
name as a mark.11 Second, there is the name’s personal or private use to signify the 
 
6. See Levitt Corp. v. Levitt, 593 F.2d 463, 468 (2d Cir. 1979) (“Goodwill is a valuable property right 
derived from a business’s reputation for quality and service. When a business purchases trademarks and 
goodwill, the essence of what it pays for is the right to inform the public that it is in possession of the special 
experience and skill symbolized by the name of the original concern, and of the sole authority to market its 
products.” (citations omitted)).  
7. Blackett, supra note 3, at 18–19 (“The value to businesses of owning strong brands is incontestable. 
Brands that keep their promise attract loyal buyers who will return to them at regular intervals. . . . The asset 
value of brands is now widely recognised, not just by brand owners but by investors.”); see also, Jan 
Lindemann, Brand Valuation, in BRANDS AND BRANDING, supra note 3, at 27, 27–30 (arguing that brands are 
most important asset in many businesses). 
8. With certain exceptions, almost anything can be used as a mark. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 
(2006) (noting that trademark which distinguishes goods should not be refused registration and listing 
exceptions to that principle).  
 The Lanham Act gives a seller or producer the exclusive right to “register” a trademark, and to 
prevent his or her competitors from using that trademark . . . . The language of the Lanham Act 
describes that universe in the broadest of terms. It says that trademarks “includ[e] any word, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof.” Since human beings might use as a “symbol” or 
“device” almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this language, read literally, is 
not restrictive. 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1052, 1127 (1988)).  
9. See 3 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND 
MONOPOLIES § 17.6 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing use of personal names as commercial or business marks).  
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127; See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995) (“A 
trademark is a word, name, symbol, device, or other designation, or a combination of such designations, that is 
distinctive of a person's goods or services and that is used in a manner that identifies those goods or services 
and distinguishes them from the goods or services of others.”). Generally, marks are divided into “four 
different categories of terms with respect to trademark protection. Arrayed in an ascending order which 
roughly reflects their eligibility to trademark status and the degree of protection accorded, these classes are (1) 
generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.” Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting 
World, Inc. 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
11. See 3 ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 9, at § 17.6. 
 The use to which one puts his name determines whether it will remain purely a symbol of his 
personality or will also symbolize his business. If he selects for his business a trademark or name 
different from his own, he keeps the two separate and distinct. If his name is used as, or in, his 
trademark or business name, he intermingles both. Of course, neither the name, the trademark, nor 
the firm name are pure symbols either of personality or business. There is no clean-cut separation. If 
a person's business or profession revolves about his personal dedication or devotion to his work 
(e.g., a teacher, artist, physician, lawyer), the name is probably connected more closely to his right 
of personality than to a property right. It is extremely difficult, however, to draw a line between the 
two, and it is only a presumption that a name is preponderantly a symbol of personality and a 
trademark or firm name a symbol of business. Whether the bearer of a name and owner of a 
trademark based on that name sustains the greater injury to his personal or business reputation in a 
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individual’s identity, which attaches to private activities and one’s own personal use of 
his or her name.12 “When an individual enters commerce under his own name, . . . his 
name and reputation will identify his business as well as his person. A commercial 
element is thus added to the personal value of the name, and it then acquires an 
independent commercial value . . . .”13  
As the value of a Personal Name Mark grows as a commodity, and as more and 
more individuals are selling the rights to their names as associated with their 
businesses,14 issues regarding the alienability of names have started to press against 
what used to be considered fundamental rights of personhood and identity. No longer 
simply a matter of assigning rights of publicity and trademark, name ownership has 
now become involved in the creation of indefinite non-competition clauses, not to 
mention prohibitions on public use of one’s name in any manner. Such moves raise the 
troubling question of whether freedom of contract should allow the alienation of all 
aspects of one’s name, or whether there should be limitations on how far parties may 
bargain.  
This Article departs from earlier scholarship on the right of publicity, trademark, 
and associated intellectual property rights in names, and focuses exclusively on the 
inclusion of contract terms in the sale of a Personal Name Mark that extend beyond the 
scope of trademark law by prohibiting any commercial use of one’s name and limiting 
personal behavior that may reduce the value of the mark.15 Specifically, this Article 
considers the right to bargain away public and private rights to one’s name whereby the 
purchaser controls increasingly more private aspects of the seller’s life and individual 
identity. As such, this Article posits that freedom of contract doctrine should not allow 
the complete alienation of all aspects of one’s name. Rather there should be limitations 
on how far parties may bargain, so that the purchaser cannot acquire the right to control 
the seller’s private activities under the rationale that these activities may find their way 
into the public sphere and thus affect the value of the public use of the seller’s name as 
a mark. Public policy considerations, constitutional concerns, administrative 
convenience, and the reluctance of the courts to enforce such agreements, should be 
considered when determining limits on the alienability of one’s identity. 
 
given case depends in part upon his personal sensitivity. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
12. See id. (“A personal name symbolizes the bearer's personality. It reflects his character, 
accomplishments and reputation. It is more than just a tag of identification, for it mirrors the individual's 
personality.”).  
13. Id. 
14. Of the 275 Fortune 1000 companies named after their founder, only fifty-four are still privately held 
by the founder’s descendents. See infra notes 108–09 and accompanying text for further discussion of the use 
of personal names as business names among Fortune 1000 companies.  
15. Scholars have focused on other significant issues of trademark law, including conflicts between the 
First Amendment and trademark law with regard to infringement of a mark, unauthorized commercial use of 
one’s right of publicity, attempts at using trademark law to regulate speech, and the limiting effects of state 
contract law with regard to intellectual property licensing. See generally Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First 
Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381 (2008); Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as 
Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. Rev. 737 (2007); Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and 
Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225 (2005); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law 
and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111 (1999).  
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It should be noted, at the outset, that this Article does not delve into trademark 
issues, such as likelihood of confusion and unfair competition claims.16 In addition, it is 
assumed that the Personal Name Mark has acquired secondary meaning and is no 
longer considered “merely a surname,”17 and that any other limitations regarding its use 
or registration as a mark have been resolved. This Article focuses on attempts to further 
 
16. See, e.g., Adray v. Adry-Mart, Inc., 76 F.3d 984, 989–90 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that in geographic 
area where plaintiff’s mark had acquired secondary meaning, defendant’s derivative use of “Adray’s” Personal 
Name Mark created likelihood of confusion); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1291–
92 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that likelihood of confusion—and thus trademark infringement—existed between 
defendant Joseph Gallo’s use of words “Gallo” and “Gallo Salame” with his first name for his wine, cheese, 
and meat products, and plaintiff’s winery trademarks); Taylor Wine Co. v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc., 569 F.2d 
731, 735 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that “[w]hen confusion is likely, . . . there must obviously be some limitation 
on an individual's unrestricted use of his own name” and that one “may not use any name, mark or 
advertisement indicating that he is the successor of another corporation or that his goods are the products of 
that corporation”).  
17. Sections 2(e)(4) and 2(f) of the Lanham Act delineate the exceptions for a mark to be registered on 
the principal register and how some such marks may later become registerable: “No trademark by which the 
goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the 
principal register on account of its nature unless it . . . . [c]onsists of a mark which . . . is primarily merely a 
surname.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2006). 
 Except as expressly excluded in subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), (e)(3), and (e)(5) of this section, 
nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has 
become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce. The Director may accept as prima facie 
evidence that the mark has become distinctive, as used on or in connection with the applicant's 
goods in commerce, proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by the 
applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the claim of distinctiveness is 
made. 
15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). Courts have established that 
 [t]he first step in determining whether an unregistered mark or name is entitled to the protection 
of the trademark laws is to categorize the name according to the nature of the term itself. 
Trademarks that are fanciful, arbitrary [i.e. made-up terms like “Kodak”] or suggestive are fully 
protected, while “descriptive words (e.g. ‘bubbly’ champagne) may be trademarked only if they 
have acquired secondary meaning, that is, only if most consumers have come to think of the word 
not as descriptive at all but as the name of the product.” 
Int’l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1085 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting Blau 
Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 609 (7th Cir. 1986)). With regard to initially unregisterable 
marks acquiring secondary meaning, 
although a term's “primary” meaning is merely descriptive, if through use the public has come to 
identify the term with a plaintiff's product or service, the words have acquired a “secondary 
meaning” and would become a protectible [sic] trademark. In other words, “‘secondary meaning’ 
denotes an association in the mind of the consumer between the trade dress [or name] of a product 
and a particular producer.” 
. . . . 
. . . “The factors which this court has indicated it will consider on the issue of secondary meaning 
include '[t]he amount and manner of advertising, volume of sales, the length and manner of use, 
direct consumer testimony, and consumer surveys.’”  
Int’l Kennel Club, 846 F.2d at 1085 (citations omitted) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting 
Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int’l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 1987) and Gimix, Inc. v. JS & A Group, 
Inc., 699 F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 1983)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13(b) 
(1995) (“A word, name, symbol, device or other designation, or a combination of such designations, is 
‘distinctive’ . . . [if] the designation, although not ‘inherently distinctive,’ has become distinctive . . . as a result 
of its use .  .  .  .  Such acquired distinctiveness is commonly referred to as ‘secondary meaning.’”).  
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limit a seller’s use—through contract—of her Personal Name Mark; that is, the extent 
to which a person may alienate through contract her private actions as they affect her 
public reputation.  
To set the stage for arguing that freedom of contract should not sanction the 
selling of our souls, this Article will proceed in five parts. Part II explores the history of 
names and their origins as a source indicator, as well as their inherent value as 
identities. Part III discusses the freedom of contract doctrine and its limitations under 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and current legal limitations due to 
unconscionability, illegality, and other public policy considerations. Part IV examines 
the broadening scope under the current case law regarding permissible restrictions 
when selling the rights to one’s name. The remainder of this Article then looks at 
whether our names should, in some part, be inalienable. Thus, Part V discusses the 
spectrum of philosophies governing limitations on freedom of contract that would, or 
would not, place limits on the rights that can be sold in relation to one’s name—rights 
that may impermissibly encroach on “Personhood.” Last, Part VI provides some final 
thoughts on the implications of unfettered freedom to contract away the rights to one’s 
name. In light of constitutional principles, public policy interests, and administrative 
feasibility, the most reasonable balance is to place some limits on the freedom to 
contract rights to one’s name. However, a more detailed analysis is required to address 
the detailed considerations of allowing a legal division between a person and their 
name. This Article sets the stage for these further discussions. 
II. PERSONAL NAMES AND PERSONAL NAME MARKS 
Any discussion regarding the value associated with one’s name and its alienability 
necessitates some background on the history of names, their use to indicate the source 
of goods, and the inherent value in a name as realized through the right of publicity. 
A. The Significance of Our Names 
Our names define who we are and establish our identity in the world. “[N]ame 
and self-identity are permanently wed.”18 As famed onomatologist19 Charles Wareing 
Bardsley20 wrote: 
 
18. JUSTIN KAPLAN & ANNE BERNAYS, THE LANGUAGE OF NAMES 10 (1997). A name is not only an 
identifier, but it is also a metaphor for reliability and a guarantee that if we are who we say we are, we will do 
what we promise to do. Id.  
19. Onomatology: “the science or study of the origin and forms of proper names of persons or places.” 
Onomastics Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
onomastics (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). 
20. Bardsley was an early pioneer in the study of surnames, and has been praised by philologists 
(philology: “the study of literature and of disciplines relevant to literature or to language as used in literature.” 
Philology Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
philology (last visited Sept. 17, 2010)), for his “many years of patient investigation. He collected an 
astonishing mass of documentary evidence . . . . His Dictionary of English and Welsh Surnames . . . contains a 
vast store of information invaluable to philologists. . . . Bardsley was a pioneer investigator . . . .” WILLIAM 
DODGSON BOWMAN, THE STORY OF SURNAMES 2–3 (1932).  
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When we remember that there is nothing without a name, and that every 
name that is named, whether it be of a man, or man’s work, or man’s 
heritage of earth, came not by chance, or accident so-called, but was given 
out of some nation’s spoken language to denote some characteristic that 
language expressed, we can readily imagine how important is the drift of 
each—what a record must each contain. We cannot but see that could we 
only grasp their true meaning, could we but take away the doubtful crust in 
which they are oftentimes imbedded, then should we be speaking out of the 
very mouth of history itself. . . . They betoken life and matter that is ever 
coming and going, ever undergoing change and decay. But through it all they 
abide.21  
Attaching a name to a person has a profound and almost magical significance 
beyond identity, that is not present in the names of mountains, classes of animals, 
cities, or anything else that has a name.22 “Our name is our passport to wherever it is 
we need to go. Without one, we are paralyzed and naked. Separate a person from her 
name—as the Nazis did with their concentration camp victims—and you take away 
what makes her human rather than simply alive.”23  
B. The Development of Surnames 
In the beginning, there were only first names. “That surnames have not existed 
since the time of Adam is known by everyone who is familiar with the Bible.”24 
Hereditary surnames were not adopted simultaneously, but rather came into use over 
several centuries.25 China was the first country to adopt hereditary surnames, where it 
was custom to strongly revere one’s paternal ancestors;26 China’s mandatory use of 
surnames was first decreed in the twenty-eighth century BCE.27 
The earliest use of hereditary family names in Europe was among the ancient 
Etruscan civilization,28 but died when that civilization did.29 Heredity surnames 
appeared in Venice in the tenth century,30 and their adoption gradually spread through 
the Italian peninsula,31 from there diffusing into France in the eleventh century32 and 
 
21. BARDSLEY, supra note 1, at 1–2.  
22. See KAPLAN & BERNAYS, supra note 18, at 11 (noting significance of names).  
23. Id. 
24. ELSDON C. SMITH, THE STORY OF OUR NAMES 27 (Gale Research Co. 1970).  
25. Id. The term “surname” as describing a hereditary family name was coined not as an indication that 
the names were inherited from one’s father, but rather because they were added after one’s first or given name. 
Id. 
26. Id. at 126. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 132. 
29. By 200 BCE, the Etruscan civilization had been devoured by the Roman Empire. GRAEME BARKER 
& TOM RASMUSSEN, THE ETRUSCANS 265–71 (1998). “The Etruscans, as everyone knows, were the people 
who occupied the middle of Italy in early Roman days and whom the Romans, in their usual neighborly 
fashion, wiped out entirely to make room for Rome with a very big R.” Id. at 262 (quoting D.H. LAWRENCE, 
ETRUSCAN PLACES (1932)). 
30. SMITH, supra note 24, at 132.  
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 27. 
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then to Germany.33 By the thirteenth century surnames were in common use.34 In 
England, there is no indication that surnames were adopted prior to the Norman 
Conquest in 1066, though they appeared to be in use shortly afterward.35 
This significant change was not brought about solely by the invasion, for it 
was a movement that was already spreading through the more populous 
countries of Europe. The rise of the large towns, and the growing 
populations in country districts made it increasingly difficult to identify an 
individual who bore only one name.36 
By the latter part of the thirteenth century, surnames were in general use in most of 
Europe37 and Great Britain.38 
English surname origins can be divided into four general classes39— local or 
geographical, patronymical,40 descriptive (i.e. nicknames), and occupational.41 One can 
think of each surname category as answering one of four questions. Local or 
geographically-derived surnames, the largest of the four categories with regard to the 
number of surnames derived in this manner, can be thought of as answering the 
question, “Where does he live or where is he from?”42  
The second class—patronymical surnames— are “derived from a father or 
ancestor, as in Wilson, the son of Wil or Johnson the son of John.”43 In “four questions” 
parlance, it answers the query, “Who is his father?”44 
Nicknames comprise the third major class of surname origins.45 Its identifying 
question is “[w]hat is his most prominent peculiarity?”46 There is a great deal of variety 
 
33. Carl Gersuny, Occupations, Occupational Surnames and the Development of Society, 8 J. POPULAR 
CULTURE 99, 100 (1974). 
34. SMITH, supra note 24, at 28.  
35. BOWMAN, supra note 20, at 5; see also SMITH, supra note 24, at 27 (noting that surnames were not 
adopted until after Norman Conquest and that practice was first used among lords).  
36. BOWMAN, supra note 20, at 5. See generally SMITH, supra note 24, for further reading on the origins 
of surnames and a history of surname development.  
37. SMITH, supra note 24, at 27–28. 
38. C. M. MATTHEWS, ENGLISH SURNAMES 48 (1966). 
39. BOWMAN, supra note 20, at 10. While surnames in other countries generally can be divided into the 
same general classes as in England, “each country has its own philological personality and history, and 
consequently its names developed differently.” SMITH, supra note 24, at 124.  
40. Patronymic: “a name derived from that of the father or a paternal ancestor usually by the addition of 
an affix.” Patronymic Definition, MERRIAN-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/patronymic (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).  
41. SMITH, supra note 24, at 44. Outside of these four major classes were surnames whose origins could 
not be attributed to any of the four general classes. BOWMAN, supra note 20, at 11. For example, some 
surnames 1) were derived from combining several sources, 2) were susceptible to more than one explanation 
or origin, or 3) were from eccentricities in spelling or dialectical differences. Id. at 11–14. Surname origins 
have also been traced to, among other sources, prophets, martyrs, warriors, maternal lineage, and pastimes. See 
generally id.  
42. SMITH, supra note 24, at 44. 
43. BOWMAN, supra note 20, at 11. 
44. SMITH, supra note 24, at 44. 
45. BOWMAN, supra note 20, at 11. 
46. SMITH, supra note 24, at 44. This could be a loaded question, if the peculiarity was of an 
“interesting” nature.  
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in this category; it includes the “names of birds, beasts, fishes, terms descriptive of 
personal attributes, as well as oaths and phrase names.”47 Prior to the advent of 
surnames, nicknames were used to distinguish individuals and families.48 
The final class—and the category of significance in this Article—are those 
surnames derived from trades, occupations or public office, such as Smith for a 
blacksmith, coppersmith, silversmith, goldsmith, shoesmith, etc.; Wright, as in 
wheelwright or wheel maker; Cook; or Sergeant.49 This surname form answered the 
inquiry, “What does he do?”50 
 That it is natural to use a man’s occupation to help identify him is 
illustrated by our disposition to refer to people today by their occupations. 
We speak of the postman, the milkman, the doctor or the druggist. In earlier 
times men usually learned their fathers’ trades, and important trade secrets 
were retained in a family for many generations, being passed down from 
father to son. This feature of father and son following the same trade gave 
impetus to the word, first applied merely as one of description, developing 
into a true hereditary family name.51  
The survival of an occupational surname as a hereditary family name depended on 
its “respectability.” “Occupations which were looked up to and respected were more 
likely to produce permanent family names than those which called attention to servile 
status.”52 In addition, the same occupation would produce a common hereditary 
surname throughout England and Europe. For example, “[e]very village, no matter how 
small, would need the services of one who could work and fashion objects out of iron 
or other metals and thus the smith is found in every country.”53  
 
47. BOWMAN, supra note 20, at 11. Nicknames, while not formally replacing surnames, continue to be 
used in all manner of forms. For example, major league baseball pitcher Randy Johnson—who at 6’10” is one 
of the tallest professional baseball players—is known as “The Big Unit.” Associated Press, Lefty Johnson 
Retires, ESPN.COM (Jan. 6, 2010, 11:16 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=4799462. The 
press has bestowed the nickname “Octomom” on Nadya Suleman, who, in 2009, gave birth to octuplets. John 
Bowe, Octo-Mom in Production, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 15, 2009, at 50.  
48. BOWMAN, supra note 20, at 6. 
49. Id. at 11. 
50. SMITH, supra note 24, at 44.  
51. Id. at 50. This is obviously from a dated source, as today we generally refer to letter carriers, there 
are few home milk deliveries, and the term “druggist” has been replaced with “pharmacist.” But the idea 
expressed by Smith regarding our inclination to identify people by their occupations remains true. See ELSDON 
C. SMITH, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN FAMILY NAMES, at xvi (1956) (“To describe one by reference to his 
occupation or profession is most natural.”). 
52. Id. at xvii (“The Stewards, Sargents and Franklins surnamed many more people in proportion to 
their numbers than the Vassals or Cotters.”); see also Gersuny, supra note 33, at 103 (“The frequency of Smith 
as an occupational surname is attributed not to the large number of smiths but to the functional importance of 
that occupation in agrarian society . . . .”). We can all think of a few modern occupations which no one would 
care to have as a surname.  
53. SMITH, supra note 51, at xvi. “Bulgaria surnames him Kovac, the Danes use Smed, the Hungarians 
say Kovars, the French call him Lefevre and Faure, the Germans say Schmidt or Smidt, in Italy it is Ferraro, 
the Russians refer to Kuznetzov, and the Poles to Kowal.” Id.  
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C. From Surnames to the Right to Privacy to the Right of Publicity 
The transformation of surnames representing business occupations to businesses 
being named after the owner set the stage for the cultural shift in the meaning of 
individual identity, leading to the development of the right to privacy and, eventually, 
the right of publicity. The creation of the right of privacy, the right to be let alone, 
constituted judicial recognition of the seclusionary personality interest, an interest that 
is distinct from reputation.”54 In their seminal paper, The Right to Privacy,55 Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis detailed the need for a right to be left alone. Warren and 
Brandeis admonished that, for years prior to their article, there had “been a feeling that 
the law must afford some remedy for the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private 
persons” and from “the evil of the invasion of privacy by the newspapers.”56  
Warren and Brandeis argued that it was necessary and desirable that our courts 
recognize and protect, at least to some extent, the right to privacy.57 After discussing 
several theories under which courts had granted relief for a wrongful publication, the 
authors concluded that there was, in case law, “a principle which may be invoked to 
protect the privacy of the individual.”58 This common law right right to privacy was  
predicated upon the interest of an individual in the exclusive nature of his 
personality. Whether phrased in terms of the right “to be let alone” or 
freedom from exposure, the right of privacy was the vehicle for the 
protection of an internal interest, the feelings of one who involuntarily has 
been publicly “used.”59 
 
54. Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of 
Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1247 (1986) (citing Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 
78 (Ga. 1905)).  
55. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).  
56. Id. at 195. 
57. Id. at 196. The authors considered whether there was, in existing law, a principle which could be 
invoked to protect an individual’s privacy, and the nature and extent of that protection. Warren and Brandeis 
argued that such a right—though with limitations—was found through an examination of the common law. See 
id. at 219 (concluding common law framework relating to defamation and artistic property provided guidance 
for right of privacy). For further discussion of the development of “right to privacy” jurisprudence from 
Warren and Brandeis’ 1890 article through 1960, see generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 
383 (1960).  
58. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 55, at 206. 
 We must therefore conclude that the rights, so protected, whatever their exact nature, are not 
rights arising from contract or from special trust, but are rights as against the world; and . . . the 
principle which has been applied to protect these rights is in reality not the principle of private 
property, unless that word be used in an extended and unusual sense. The principle which protects 
personal writings and any other productions of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right to 
privacy, and the law has no new principle to formulate when it extends this protection to the 
personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal relation, domestic or otherwise. 
Id. at 213. The authors additionally declared that “[t]he common law secures to each individual the right of 
determining . . . to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.” Id. at 
198 (citing Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 242 (K.B.)).  
59. Halpern, supra note 54, at 1204. Halpern discusses the growth of the right to privacy as a “common-
law right of redress for nondefamatory, but unconsented to, exposure of [an individual’s] likeness.” Id. at 1203 
(citing Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80–81 (Ga. 1905)). For a detailed case-law history 
on the development of the right of publicity from the right to privacy, see generally id. See also Gloria Franke, 
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The right of publicity—that is, “a right flowing from the economic value of 
celebrity”60—was initially derived out of the right of privacy.61 Indeed, Warren and 
Brandeis hint at a distinction for those “who, in varying degrees, have renounced the 
right to live their lives screened from public observation.”62 Courts distinguished 
between the causes of action available for emotional distress due to invasion of privacy 
versus economic damage due to unauthorized commercial use based on one’s right of 
publicity.63 Initially, “[b]attle lines [were] drawn over whether the creature emerging 
from the fermenting ooze of modern mass communications [was] a species of 
‘property’ or a purely personal ‘privacy’ interest.”64 In his articles on commercial 
exploitation of the right of publicity,65 Sheldon Halpern notes several early rights-of-
publicity decisions whereby courts rejected claims of privacy rights violations by 
celebrities.66 These held that a celebrity67 could not sue under an invasion of privacy 
theory for the unauthorized commercialization of his identity because, through his 
public actions, “[t]he celebrity effectively has waived his right of privacy and can have 
no relief under a ‘privacy’ umbrella.”68  
 
Note, The Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment: Will One Test Ever Capture the Starring Role?, 79 S. 
CALIF. L. REV. 945, 948–53 (2006) (commenting on struggle between Brandeis & Warren’s conception of 
right to privacy, and right to publicity sought by celebrities beginning in twentieth century); Barbara Singer, 
The Right of Publicity: Star Vehicle or Shooting Star?, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6–32 (1991) 
(analyzing history of right to privacy through case law, and how it developed over time into right to publicity).  
60. Halpern, supra note 54, at 1208. “Judge Frank . . . held that . . . New York law recognized an 
independent, common-law right protecting economic interests rather than the personal, emotional interests 
contemplated by the right of privacy; and that such a right, by its nature, must be exclusively assignable.” Id. 
(referring to Judge Frank’s pronouncement recognizing the right of publicity in Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps 
Chewing Gum, Inc. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953)). 
61. Id. at 1205 (“As an historical phenomenon, the right of privacy was born and developed at a time 
when celebrity was not itself a commodity capable of widespread exploitation.”). For a detailed discussion on 
the social history regarding both the development of the right of publicity (beginning with Josiah Wedgwood 
placing portraits on his china in the 1770s) and the expansion of commercial exploitation of famous persons, 
see Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. 
REV. 125, 147–78 (1993).  
62. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 55, at 215.  
63. Halpern, supra note 54, at 1204–05 (“‘Relief is available under the applicable privacy law only for 
acts that invade plaintiffs’ privacy and consequently bruise their feelings.’” (quoting Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. 
Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983))).  
64. Id. at 1201 (footnote omitted). 
65. Halpern, supra note 54; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent 
Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1995).  
66. Halpern, supra note 54, at 1206 n.34 (“‘[F]or as public figures, with their likenesses, names and 
images already in the public domain, they have waived their rights to claim intrusions into their common law 
privacy rights . . . . Moreover, they cannot demonstrate harm to their feelings justifying legal action.’” (quoting 
Bi-Rite, 555 F. Supp. at 1198)). Halpern cites to several other jurisdictions which held that there was no 
common law privacy claim based only on a celebrity’s public exposure. Id. (citing Carson v. Here’s Johnny 
Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983); O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 169 (5th 
Cir. 1941)).  
67. Dean William Prosser defines a celebrity as “one who by his own voluntary efforts has succeeded in 
placing himself in the public eye.” Prosser, supra note 57, at 410. However, “even a celebrity [is] entitled to 
his private life, and [is] a public figure only as to matters already public and those which directly [bear] upon 
them.” Id. at 416.  
68. Halpern, supra note 54, at 1206. In light of this implied waiver, however, courts recognized that “[i]n 
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Taking into consideration the reluctance of courts to allow tort claims based on 
invasion of privacy, yet recognizing the risk of misappropriation, jurists were “willing 
to recognize a distinct commercial exploitation interest, but only after ritually loosening 
it from its privacy mooring or other, more traditional berths.”69 This right to 
commercial exploitation of one’s name was generally recognized as a distinct right, 
separate from the right of privacy. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 
Inc.70 is considered the seminal case which “recognized the independent right of 
publicity by differentiating that right from the already existing right of privacy.”71 In 
Haelan, the Second Circuit clarified the distinction between an economic right in one’s 
personality for the purposes of commercial exploitation and a privacy interest whereby 
one has the right to be left alone.72 
Haelan, a chewing-gum manufacturer, had a contract with a baseball player 
whereby the baseball player assigned Haelan the exclusive right to put the player’s 
photograph on trading cards.73 Topps, a rival company, later contracted with the same 
player to use the player’s photo on its cards.74 Haelan sued Topps, claiming the 
defendant induced the athlete to breach his contract.75 The Second Circuit reversed the 
lower court’s dismissal;76 the appellate court recognized a legal interest in the 
publication of a person’s picture beyond the right of privacy, and held that Haelan, as 
the assignee of the player’s right of publicity, had standing to sue Topps.77 
[I]n addition to and independent of that right of privacy . . . a man has a right 
in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive 
privilege of publishing his picture . . . . 
 This right might be called a “right of publicity.” For it is common 
knowledge that many prominent persons . . . far from having their feelings 
bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely 
deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements, 
popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, 
busses, trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them 
no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which 
barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.78  
 
a societal context in which unauthorized commercial appropriation of a personality is seen as an invasion, 
causing shame, discomfort, or irritation, rather than economic loss, it is not unreasonable for such an 
appropriation to be considered part of the privacy interest.” Id. at 1205 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
69. Id. at 1209. 
70. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
71. Halpern, supra note 54, at 1203.  
72. Id.  
73. Haelan, 202 F. 2d at 867.  
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 869. 
77. Id. at 868–69. 
78.  Id. at 868; see also Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn 
from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1173 (2006) (“Haelan’s new cause of action differed from the 
right of privacy in several important ways. Most significantly, as an economic rather than a personal right, the 
right of publicity was fully alienable, meaning that third parties could acquire a celebrity’s publicity rights and 
have standing to sue for violations.”); David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 
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Haelan and later cases established a separate right of publicity which protects “a 
distinct economic interest in personality.”79 The American legal community differed as 
to the extent of the rights beyond commercial exploitation of one’s name.80 However, 
by 1993, it was recognized as a distinct right in the Third Restatement of the Law of 
Unfair Competition which held parties liable for the unauthorized appropriation of “a 
person’s identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia 
of identity for purposes of trade.”81 This recognition of a right to publicity (and the 
commercial value of that right) illustrated the shift by courts to consider publicity as 
bearing on a property right rather than a privacy interest,82 even though the right has 
never fully broken free “of its roots in the right to privacy.”83  
 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 76 (2005) (“[W]hat Haelan . . . did was to make the right of publicity 
alienable via assignment or license.”).  
79. Halpern, supra note 54, at 1202. Other cases which Halpern cites, to demonstrate support for this 
doctrine, include Lerman v. Flynt Distributor Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984) and Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Button Master, 555 F. Supp 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Halpern, supra note 54, at 1202 n.12. Courts now 
generally recognize the right of publicity as separate from the right of privacy. See, e.g., McFarland v. Miller, 
14 F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Federal courts first recognized the right of publicity in Haelan Laboratories. 
. . . The New Jersey courts have recognized a similar right of exploitation.”); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. 
Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970) (“[A] celebrity has a legitimate proprietary interest in his public 
personality. . . . [and] must be considered to have invested his years of practice and competition in a public 
personality which eventually may reach marketable status. That identity . . . is the fruit of his labors and is a 
type of property.”); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979), superseded by statute, CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2010) (“[The] right of publicity means in essence that the reaction of the public to 
name and likeness, which may be fortuitous or which may be managed or planned, endows the name and 
likeness of the person involved with commercially exploitable opportunities.”).  
80. See Halpern, supra note 54, at 1233–37 (discussing different judicial approaches to question of 
whether, and how far, celebrity’s right of publicity descends after death); Halpern, supra note 65, at 858–59 
(noting alienability and descendibility of right, as well as difficulty in defining protected “identity,” have been 
areas of ongoing debate); Madow, supra note 61, at 177 n.255 (citing cases and statutes expanding right 
beyond name and likeness, to include such things as manner of dress, voice, and style of performance). 
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995); see also Halpern, supra note 65, at 
859. 
Here the right has fully emerged, free of its analogic ancestors, free of the constraints of a privacy 
pigeonhole in the Restatement of Torts. With a base in the law of unfair competition, the 
commercial, economic, appropriation characteristics of the interest to which the right of publicity 
relates are fully recognized. 
Id.  
82. Jody C. Campbell, Note, Who Owns Kim Basinger? The Right of Publicity’s Place in the Bankruptcy 
System, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 179, 188 (2005) (citing State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found. v. 
Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)). 
Yet to conclude that the right of publicity is exclusively a proprietary interest would be overly 
simplistic and lack an appreciation of the larger picture. Modern courts continue to use privacy as a 
foundation for a publicity infringement suit. Thus, it is more intellectually appropriate to see the 
right of publicity and the right of privacy not as mutually exclusive, but rather as protecting 
different interests originating from the same wrong. 
Id. at 191 (footnote omitted). Campbell notes that the Supreme Court has defined two separate yet related 
causes of action: the “violation of the right to privacy and misappropriation of persona rights are two separate 
causes of action, which protect different interests: the right of privacy protects a dignitary interest; the right of 
publicity protects a commercial interest.” Id. at 188, 191 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 
U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (“‘The interest protected in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light is 
clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defamation. By contrast, the State's 
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Today, under Section 46 of the Restatement, there are no boundaries or 
requirements as to the famousness or lack thereof of the person who wishes to exercise 
their right to exploit the commercial value of her identity.84 It applies equally to the 
small business owner who wishes to use her goodwill in a Personal Name Mark as it 
does to those individuals who have become “household names.” 
D. Personal Name Marks 
We recognize that celebrities can “affect the marketability of goods, services, and 
creative works.”85 An endorsement by Oprah Winfrey can turn an unknown novel into 
a best seller.86 And similarly, when we use our names in connection with a business, 
we are drawing on the associative value of our identities87—that is, our persona’s 
economic impact on the marketability of goods or services.88 For example, a plumber 
who was employed by another company may have developed a reputation among her 
customers for her services,89 and when starting her own business might choose to 
capitalize on this goodwill by utilizing her name for her company.90 She has the right to 
exploit her reputation91 for high quality work as a form of celebrity, and the “market 
 
interest in permitting a right of publicity is in protecting the proprietary interest of the individual in his act in 
part to encourage such entertainment.’” (quoting Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). That being said, “courts have recognized that the damages to celebrities through the infringement of 
their persona rights are not purely economic.” Id. at 195. 
83. Id. at 203. 
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).  
85. Halpern, supra note 54, at 1239.  
86. Oprah Winfrey Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://www.biography.com/articles/Oprah-Winfrey-
9534419?part=1 (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). 
87. See Halpern, supra note 54, at 1242–46 (providing examples where name or likeness of celebrity 
was used to market products, such as Elvis Presley T-shirts and famous race cars associated with certain 
cigarettes).  
88. Id. at 1242. 
89. Though “celebrities do not make their image in the same way [that] a carpenter makes a chair.” 
Westfall & Landau, supra note 78, at 118.  
90. See Halpern, supra note 65, at 856–59 (explaining that products and services which associate 
themselves with celebrities attempt to build on goodwill of celebrities’ personas). 
 When an individual’s name functions as a trademark, the name then, like any trademark, is an 
indication of origin, a symbol of goodwill, and a medium of advertising. And inasmuch as a 
trademark is always, in a sense, a name, it is to a certain degree inseparable from the personality of 
the trademark owner. But an individual is free to determine the extent to which he will associate his 
name with his business reputation . . . . 
ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 9, at § 17.6 (4th ed. 2009); see also Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, 
Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804–05 (Cal. 2001) (“Years of labor may be required before one's skill, reputation, notoriety 
or virtues are sufficiently developed to permit an economic return through some medium of commercial 
promotion. . . . For some, the investment may eventually create considerable commercial value in one's 
identity.”); Jacy T. Jasmer, Comment, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.: A Workable Standard, an 
Unworkable Decision, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 293, 300–01 (2004) (recognizing tension between 
celebrities’ investments and First Amendment).  
91. “The security of his reputation or good name from the arts of detraction and slander, are rights to 
which every man is entitled, by reason and natural justice; since without these it is impossible to have the 
perfect enjoyment of any other advantage or right.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134.  
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place recognizes [the] associative value” of her name which affects the renown and 
thus the success of her business.92 
As noted earlier, one of the earlier origins of surnames is related to one’s 
occupation.93 Merging the concept of names as indicators of one’s profession with 
names as instruments for economic exploitation, names are used today not merely for 
economic interests arising from celebrity, but as Personal Name Marks—or brands—to 
indicate source or sponsorship of goods and services in commerce.94 Though the name 
does not indicate the type of business, the business is nevertheless identified by the 
Personal Name Mark of the individual business owner. As noted previously,95 this 
creates a dual use of one’s name that is different from the right to privacy/right of 
publicity dichotomy: the use of one’s name can be bifurcated into (1) one’s public 
actions related to the name as a mark—that is, the use of one’s name in commerce in 
connection with goods or services as an indicator of source or sponsorship and one’s 
right of publicity—and (2) one’s own personal use of his or her name. The latter use is 
the first use. “[B]efore one can have a good name, he must have a name; before he can 
build a reputation, he must have an identity to which that reputation may attach.”96 As 
the District Court of Connecticut noted in Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing 
Co.,97 the common law “has from ancient times” acknowledged the individual’s 
“exclusive right to the identity which he has established for himself among his fellows 
and in the public eye.”98 We must therefore question whether personal use can be 
completely consumed through extensive brand recognition.99 
 
92.  Halpern, supra note 54, at 1243. “‘Today, it is commonplace for individuals to promote or advertise 
commercial services and products or . . . even have their identities infused in the products. . . . Such 
commercial use of an individual’s identity is intended to increase the value or sales of the product by fusing 
the celebrity’s identity with the product . . . .’” Id. at 1243 n.260 (quoting Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 
P.2d 425, 437–38 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting), superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 
2010)). For an in-depth discussion on the associative value of celebrity, see Halpern, supra note 54, at 1239–
47, and Halpern, supra note 65, at 856–61.  
93. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text for a discussion of surnames derived from 
occupations.  
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining trade or commercial name as “any name used by a person to 
identify his or her business or vocation”); see also Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1032 (3d Cir. 
2008) (holding that “Pennsylvania's right of publicity is meant to protect . . . a citizen's prerogative not to have 
his or her name, likeness, voice, or identity used in a commercial advertisement, whether that citizen is a 
celebrity or not,” essentially providing in gross right to use of one’s name).  
95. See supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the duel use of one’s name. 
96. Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 758 (D. Conn. 1935).  
97. 9 F. Supp. 754 (D. Conn. 1935). 
98. Id. at 758. 
[I]f indeed reputation is a matter of right, to be known as a particular individual is a right even more 
fundamental. Conceivably, some alien civilization might exist wherein each member of society was 
consigned to perpetual anonymity; wherein each was doomed to live and die as one ant in the hill, 
or as one cog in the machine of the state, without means or right for any identification of 
personality. But the common law has more nobly appraised the fullness of human life . . . .  
Id. The force behind one’s reputation is of biblical proportions. See Ecclesiastes 7:1 (New American Standard) 
(“A good name is better than a good ointment.”). 
99. Even after a brand that began primarily as a surname has gained acquired distinctiveness through 
secondary meaning, the brand continues to benefit from its descriptiveness. 
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We create property rights in our name when we use them as Personal Name 
Marks,100 which can be defined as a “designation that is likely to be perceived by 
prospective purchasers . . . as the personal name of a person connected with the goods, 
services, or business” 101 with which it is used. As an asset of the business, we hope to 
build value in the Personal Name Mark,102 and as property, it is alienable just as if it 
were a physical asset.103  
It could be contended that by achieving such alienability, all rights associated with 
the name—including its use in the private sphere—become transferable.  However, one 
may counter that there is an inherent “selfness” in one’s name that should be 
considered nontransferable. Our names are not just names but go to our identity, 
reputation, self-regard, and self-determination.104 “[N]ames penetrate the core of our 
being and are a form of poetry, storytelling, magic, and compressed history.”105 Thus, 
“even when a personal name has become a trade name it continues to serve the 
important function to its bearer of acting as a symbol of that individual’s personality, 
reputation and accomplishments as distinguished from that of the business, corporation 
or otherwise, with which he has been associated.”106 It may be impossible to ever truly 
separate a person from her name. Even requiring a seller to legally change her name 
may not be sufficient. The press, family, friends, and members of the public would 
never forget the former identity and naturally refer to the individual by both names, 
thereby making the name change a fruitless effort in achieving the desired result.107 It is 
 
100. S. Scrap Material Co. v. Smith, 44 So. 2d 754, 755 (Ala.1950) (“[A] person has no property right in 
his individual personal name as used to identify himself as an individual, but when his name is used as a trade 
or commercial name a property right is created in it in association with the business or trade it identifies.”). 
There is no absolute property right to use one’s name in connection with her business when it is likely to cause 
customer confusion, misappropriate goodwill, or otherwise infringe on another’s trademark. See generally 
Floyd A. Mandell, Personal Name Trademarks—Your Name May Not Be Your Own, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 326 
(1980). 
101.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 14 (1995).  
102. See generally Lindemann, supra note 7 (explaining significance of intangible asset value to 
business success).  
103. See, e.g., Radcliffe 10, L.L.C. v. Zip Tube Sys. of La., Inc., 998 So. 2d 107, 116–17 (La. Ct. App. 
2008) (finding name of business alienable via contract).  
104. KAPLAN & BERNAYS, supra note 18, at 13.  
105. Id. 
106. Madrigal Audio Labs., Inc. v. Cello, Ltd. 799 F.2d 814, 822 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing 3 ALTMAN & 
POLLACK, supra note 9, at § 17.6).  
107. Some people who legally change their names will never out-distance themselves from their former 
identities. In one of the most widely reported examples, Jeff Gillooly (ice skater Tonya Harding’s husband) 
changed his name in 1995 to Jeffrey Stone, yet continues to be reported in the press by both names. Abby 
Haight, Mastermind Rethinks Life After Tonya Stone Says He Changed More Than His Name, THE 
OREGONIAN, Feb. 4, 1998, at D1; see also Filip Bondy, Frozen In Time: Nancy and Tonya—Lives Change, 
Roles the Same 10 Years Later, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 9, 2004, at 1C (“[Tonya Harding’s] ex-husband Jeff 
Gillooly (now Jeff Stone) . . . arranged the assault on [rival ice skater Nancy] Kerrigan . . . .”); Barry Wilner, 
Harding Tells Harrowing Story in New Book, USATODAY.COM (May 15, 2008, 6:59 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2008-05-15-4015497852_x.htm (referring to Gillooly by his former 
name, and in passing, mentioning that he is “now named Jeff Stone”). Gillooly/Stone’s co-conspirator, Sean 
Griffith, also changed his name, which was mentioned in his obituary. Bodyguard in Kerrigan Attack Dies at 
40, USATODAY.COM (Dec. 16, 2007, 6:40 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-12-15-
2064735510_x.htm (“Formerly Shawn Eckardt, Griffith had changed his name since the attack in an attempt to 
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doubtful as to whether one who is famous or has established a strong brand through her 
Personal Name Mark can ever completely divorce herself from her identity. 
Both full names and surnames of business owners have been incorporated into or 
used as a business name and brand.108 Among Fortune 1000 companies, 275 (27.5%) 
were originally named after the corporation’s founder: of these, 199 used some form of 
the founder’s name, and 76 used the founder’s full name.109 The numbers appear to be 
even higher for small companies, on the order of twenty to fifty percent for some 
business categories.110 These companies are all potential purchase targets. For those 
with Personal Name Marks still owned by the named person, how far the owners’ 
identities may be sold will depend on how far freedom of contract should reach into the 
sellers’ private lives. 
III. THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT DOCTRINE AND ITS GENERAL LIMITATIONS UNDER 
CURRENT LAW 
It is well recognized that, through contract, one can bargain away that which one 
owns or for which one has a legal right.111 Under common law, “[t]he general rule is 
that competent persons shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and that their 
agreements voluntarily and fairly made shall be held valid and enforced in the 
courts.”112 Thus, freedom of contract doctrine—an integral part of contract law since 
Blackstone113—provides us with the ability to bargain away rights to which we would 
otherwise be entitled.114 Indeed, Robert Braucher, reporter for the second Restatement 
of Contracts, noted that “[p]erhaps the most noticeable shift [between the first and 
second Restatements of Contracts was] the increased respect accorded to freedom of 
contract—to the power of the contracting parties to control the rights and duties they 
create.”115  
 
put it behind him.”); see also Mike Celizic, Tonya Harding Reveals Her Side of ‘Roller-Coaster Life,’ 
TODAYSHOW.COM (May 15, 2008, 10:45 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24645352/ (“Gillooly, who 
has changed his name to Jeff Stone, told TODAY Harding's claims are ‘utterly ridiculous.’”).  
108. Examples include Wal-Mart, founded by Sam Walton, and the self-named companies of Levi 
Strauss and John Deere. Fortune 500 2008, CNNMONEY.COM 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2008/full_list/index.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). 
109. Id. Of the fully-named companies, seventy are now publicly owned with twenty-two having family 
involvement. Of the partially-named companies, 181 are publicly owned with fifty-one having family 
ownership. Data on file with author. Until it was liquidated in 2008, Lehman Brothers continued to be a private 
company controlled by the descendants of Henry, Emanuel, and Mayer Lehman. Peter Kiewit Sons and Levi 
Strauss continue to be privately held companies controlled by the Kiewit and Strauss families, respectively. 
Data on file with author. 
110. A survey of companies in the St. Louis area revealed that among masons, plumbers, general 
contractors, jewelry retailers, and automobile repair companies, over forty percent of the businesses were 
named after the owner. In addition, over twenty percent of all barbers, beauty salons, and appliance dealers in 
the St. Louis area were self-named businesses. Data on file with author.  
111.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 1–3 (1981) (defining contracts).  
112. Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356 (1931). 
113. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442–49.  
114. See Robert Braucher, Freedom of Contract and the Second Restatement, 78 YALE L.J. 598, 599–
600 (1969) (stating that a bargained-for performance is consideration).  
115. Id. at 598. 
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However, while on one hand declaring that “bargains are enforceable,”116 the 
Restatement also acknowledged that exceptions exist to freedom of contract when 
“some other principle conflicts.”117 As noted by Bracher,  
the bases for enforcement set forth in Section 90 (detrimental reliance), 
Section 89A (promise for benefit received), and Section 89B (firm offer), 
emphasize the discretion that courts have to assure that injustice is 
prevented. But the fact remains that freedom of contract is explicit as a major 
feature of the second Restatement: “The governing principle in the typical 
case is that bargains are enforceable unless some other principle conflicts.” 
Much of the rest is rationalization of the basic principle and commentary.118  
The fact that some contract clauses—and entire contracts—are not legally 
enforceable under common law has a direct bearing on the purchase of a Personal 
Name Mark. The unenforceability of some agreements creates a balancing act between 
the ability to bargain freely and ensuring the elemental fairness of the transaction.119 
Issues which result in a defective, and thus unenforceable, contract120 include: (i) lack 
of capacity of either party;121 (ii) unconscionability;122 (iii) illegality;123 (iv) and when 
the contract is against public policy.124 
 
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 17 cmt. b (1981); see also Braucher, supra note 114, at 
601 (discussing importance of belief that bargains are enforceable).  
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 17 cmt. b (1981); see also Braucher, supra note 114, at 
599 (“[T]he changes in the Restatement are in the direction of being more candid in stating the limitations on 
freedom of contract.”).  
118. Braucher, supra note 114, at 599 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. b 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1964)).  
119.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). 
120. Contract formation consists of an offer, acceptance, and consideration. DANIEL J. BUSSEL & 
ARTHUR I. ROSETT, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 631 (7th ed. 2006).  
121. As stated in Section 12 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, “[n]o one can be bound by 
contract who has not legal capacity to incur at least voidable contractual duties.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 12(1) (1981). Section 12(1) elaborates that “[c]apacity to contract may be partial and its 
existence in respect of a particular transaction may depend upon the nature of the transaction or upon other 
circumstances.” Id. 
 The courts have recognized specific categories of individuals who lack capacity to enter into legally 
binding agreements. “A natural person who manifests assent to a transaction has full legal capacity to incur 
contractual duties thereby unless he is (a) under guardianship, or (b) an infant, or (c) mentally ill or defective, 
or (d) intoxicated.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12(2) (1981). For example, “infants,” a term 
which encompasses individuals under the age of majority, protects minors from being exploited due to their 
immaturity. 
[T]he protection of infants is one of the chief concerns of the law. The rule is that no one may deal 
with a minor, except for necessaries. Lord Coke said that an infant may bind himself for his meat, 
drink, apparel, necessary physic and other such necessaries, and likewise for his good teaching or 
instruction, whereby he may profit himself afterward. This, generally speaking, has been accepted 
as the true doctrine. An infant is not competent to contract. This positive inhibition is the way of the 
law to protect infants against their own lack of discretion and against the snares of designing 
persons. 
In re O’Leary’s Estate, 42 A.2d 624, 625 (Pa. 1945) (citation omitted). 
 Lack of capacity may be permanent or temporary. For example, a person who lacks capacity to enter into 
a contract because he is drunk has created a voidable contract, and once sober may either void or ratify the 
agreement. See, e.g., Williamson v. Matthews, 379 So. 2d 1245, 1247–48 (Ala. 1980) (“The drunkenness of a 
party at the time of making a contract may render the contract voidable, but it does not render it void; and to 
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The burdens are on the party looking to invalidate the contract. “Courts generally 
assume that ‘bargains are enforceable and that the party asking the court to intervene to 
invalidate a bargain should demonstrate the justice of his or her position.’”125 This 
includes both “the ‘burden of proving facts which would justify [a] trial court’s 
concluding that the clause should not be enforced and the burden of persuading the 
court that the provision should not be enforced.’”126  
 Unconscionable Contracts 
A contract that is “unconscionable,” and thus unenforceable, is one that no person 
“‘in his [or her] senses’” would make and that “no honest and fair person would 
accept,” with “the inequality being ‘so strong and manifest as to shock the conscience 
and confound the judgment of any [person] of common sense.’”127 For example, a 
contract for a new home in which the purchaser agreed to waive the right to punitive 
damages and a jury trial for any construction defect claims was found to be an 
unconscionable contract of adhesion.128 
 
render the contract voidable, it must be made to appear that the party was intoxicated to such a degree that he 
was, at the time of the contracting, incapable of exercising judgment, understanding the proposed engagement, 
and of knowing what he was about when he entered into the contract sought to be avoided.”); see also 
Stockmen's Guar. Loan Co. v. Sanchez, 194 P. 603, 605 (N.M. 1920) (“The voidable contracts of an 
intoxicated person may be ratified by him when he becomes sober, and, if so ratified, they become binding 
upon him and may be enforced. This may be done by any act which clearly recognizes the contracts as valid 
and shows an intention ‘to be bound by it, or it may be done by a failure to disaffirm within a reasonable 
time.’”).  
122. See infra notes 127–31 and accompanying text for a discussion of unconscionable contracts.  
123. See infra notes 132–35 and accompanying text for a discussion of illegal contracts. 
124. See infra notes 136–41 and accompanying text, for a discussion of contracts contrary to public 
policy. Other causes of a defective—and therefore unenforceable—contract include: not satisfying the Statute 
of Frauds in an agreement that falls within the Statute of Frauds; misrepresentation; acceptance of the contract 
under duress; mistake at the time of the agreement as to material facts affecting the agreement; and ambiguous 
contracts. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 110–177 (1981). 
125. Westhaven Assocs., Ltd. v. C.C. of Madison, Inc., 652 N.W.2d 819, 824 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) 
(quoting Wassenaar v. Panos, 331 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Wis. 1983)). 
126. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Wassenaar, 331 N.W.2d at 357); see also Cent. Steel Drum Co. v. 
Gold Cooperage, Inc., 491 A.2d 49, 57 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (“‘Placing the burden of proof on the 
challenger is consistent with giving the nonbreaching party the advantage inherent in stipulated damages 
clauses of eliminating the need to prove damages, and with the general principle that the law assumes that 
bargains are enforceable and that the party asking the court to intervene to invalidate a bargain should 
demonstrate the justice of his or her position.’” (quoting Wassenaar, 331 N.W.2d at 361)) overruled by Kutzin 
v. Pirnie, 591 A.2d 932 (N.J. 1991). 
127. Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 855 (N.Y. 1977) (alterations in original) (quoting Hume v. 
United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) and Mandel v. Liebman, 100 N.E.2d 149, 152 (N.Y. 1951)). 
128. Pardee Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 292–93 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). A 
contract of adhesion 
signifies a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining 
strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it. 
If the contract is adhesive, the court must then determine whether other factors are present which, 
under established legal rules . . . operate to render it unenforceable. 
Id. at 292 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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That the parties to the bargain are in unequal positions of power does not in and of 
itself render an agreement unconscionable.129 And merely the result of a better deal for 
the party in the stronger position will not render the contract an unconscionable one.130 
Rather, “gross inequality of the bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably 
favorable to the stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction involved 
elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no 
meaningful choice.”131  
 Illegal Contracts 
A contract will also not be enforced when its terms violate the law.132 For 
example, an attorney who used another’s real property as collateral for writing bail 
bonds in return for a share of the bail-bond fees generated was an illegal contract, 
because statutes regulated bail-bond sureties and forbade such arrangements.133 
And in a rather bizarre example of an illegal, and thus unenforceable, contract, the 
creators of the Zeus “malware”134 software program “have added an end-user license 
agreement to their ‘product,’ setting out a bunch of terms controlling how the criminals 
who buy their products may use it, and threatening dire technological reprisals for 
violations.”135  
 Contracts Violative of Public Policy 
Courts have long held that “[t]he ability to contract is not absolute and without 
limits. Parties cannot privately waive statutes enacted to protect the public in 
general.”136 As declared in Section 178(1) of the second Restatement of Contracts, “[a] 
promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if 
legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly 
 
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981).  
130. Id. 
131. Id.; see also Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379, 382 (Alaska 1986) (holding that contract terms by 
which elderly woman sold apartment building, requiring small monthly payment for thirty years and balance 
due when seller would be 103 years old, was unconscionable). 
132. See, e.g., Reno Hilton Resorts v. NLRB, 196 F.3d 1275, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[A] party cannot 
exercise its contractual rights in violation of the law.”); see also Kincaid v. Black Angus Motel, Inc., 983 P.2d 
1016, 1018 (Okla. 1999) (“A contract made in violation of a statute is void and when a plaintiff cannot 
establish his cause of action without relying upon an illegal contract, he cannot recover.”).  
133. Villanueva v. Gonzalez, 123 S.W.3d 461, 463–67 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); see also Evans v. Luster, 
928 P.2d 455, 457–59 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that contract for clearing wetlands, where parties agreed 
to violate county code provisions by avoiding required permits, was illegal and thus unenforceable).  
134. Malware, a combination of the words “malicious” and “software,” is software designed to cause 
damage to another person’s computer. Robert Moir, Defining Malware: FAQ, MICROSOFT TECHNET (OCT. 01, 
2003), http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd632948.aspx. 
135. Cory Doctorow, Malware Gets a EULA, BOINGBOING, (April 29, 2008, 3:13 AM), 
http://www.boingboing.net/2008/04/29/malware-gets-a-eula.html. 
136. Phx. Physical Therapy v. Unemp’t Ins. Div. Contributions Bureau, 943 P.2d 523, 528 (Mont. 1997) 
(citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-3-204 (1947)).  
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outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such 
terms.”137  
Courts have historically declared contracts as unenforceable in a variety of 
contexts when the terms are considered in conflict with public policy.138 For example, 
in Rogers v. Webb,139 the Supreme Court of Iowa explained that a contract which 
“provides for, facilitates or tends to induce a separation or divorce of the parties’” is 
against the state’s interest in preserving the integrity of marriage and thus “‘contrary to 
[a fundamental] public policy and void.’”140 Courts have also held that an agreement 
which restrains trade will be unenforceable as violative of public policy if the 
restriction does not have reasonable time and space limitations.141  
IV. THE TREND TOWARDS FEWER RESTRICTIONS ON SELLING THE RIGHTS TO ONE’S 
NAME 
With these contract limitations in mind, there has been a general trend towards 
fewer restrictions in selling the rights to one’s name. As previously noted, this Article’s 
focus is on contracting rights even when there is no likelihood of confusion.142 The 
Ninth Circuit reiterated the current law in 1985 in Sardi’s Restaurant Corp. v. 
Sardie,143 where it acknowledged the long-held principle that “‘courts are naturally 
reluctant wholly to forbid a man to do business in his own name and have generally 
refused to do so,’”144 so long as such use does not mislead the public as to the identity 
 
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981); see also A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 
1058 (Mass. 2000) (“It is well-established that courts will not enforce contracts that violate public policy. 
While courts are hesitant to invalidate contracts on these public policy grounds, the public interest in freedom 
of contract is sometimes outweighed by other public policy considerations; in those cases the contract will not 
be enforced.” (citations omitted)). 
138. See, e.g., A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1058–59 (finding public policy supporting freedom of personal choice 
in marriage and family life outweighs freedom of contract).  
139. 558 N.W.2d 155 (Iowa 1997). 
140. Rogers, 558 N.W.2d at 157 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
141. E.g., Loranger Constr. Co. v. C. Franklin Corp., 247 N.E.2d 391, 393 (Mass. 1969); see also 
Cariveau v. Halferty, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 417, 418–19, 421–25 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that confidentiality 
clause in contract which prohibited customer from discussing broker’s misconduct with regulatory authorities 
harmed public in general and was void as violative of public policy); Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n v. Ristorante 
Toscano, Inc., 662 N.E.2d 1015, 1018–19 (Mass. 1996) (holding contract unenforceable in which 
neighborhood association promised not to oppose restaurant’s beer and wine license in exchange for promise 
that restaurant would not seek general alcohol license); DiLeo v. Daneault, 109 N.E.2d 824, 828 (Mass. 1953) 
(holding unenforceable contract requiring proprietor of union barber shop to join barbers' union); Allen v. City 
of Lawrence, 61 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Mass. 1945) (holding unenforceable contract in which public official agreed 
to accept lower salary than established by law); New Haven Road Constr. Co. v. Long, 168 N.E. 161, 162 
(Mass. 1929) (holding unenforceable contract requiring payment to private contractor for use of public 
highway); Parsons v. Trask, 73 Mass. (1 Gray) 473, 478 (1856) (holding unenforceable contract terms 
establishing unlimited period of servitude).  
142. See supra note 16 and accompanying text for a discussion of trademark and confusion issues not 
addressed in this paper.  
143. 755 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1985).  
144. Sardi’s Rest., 755 F.2d at 725 (quoting 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
13:3(D) (2d ed. 1984)). 
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of the source of goods or services.145 The law regarding a trademark infringement or 
unfair competition claim has stayed relatively straightforward regarding this aspect of 
the use of personal names and the likelihood of confusion assertion.146 
The starting point for a discussion on which personal rights associated with one’s 
name may be alienable is Section 34 of the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition. 
Section 34 declares that “[a]n assignment of a personal name mark will not ordinarily 
be interpreted to preclude the named individual from all subsequent use of the name in 
business unless the intention to do so is clearly expressed.”147  
The bargaining and deal-making related to one’s name as a business asset has 
increasingly led to transfers of rights which society has previously thought to be closely 
tied to the individual, almost to the point of total alienability.148 When a company’s 
corporate name or brand is also an individual’s name, it is actually selling two assets: 
the name’s use as a trademark and the individual’s right of publicity. Both are 
inextricably linked. Indeed, the corporate name may in time overshadow its private 
nature. “When a name is used as a trademark, it risks becoming a symbol of the 
corporation and its past accomplishments and losing its individual identity.”149  
Fashion designers offer prime illustrations of the issues that arise when one’s 
name is used for their brand.150 For example, when Sigrid Olsen sold her fashion 
designing business to Liz Claiborne, Inc., the sale included not only the physical assets 
of the business (such as her clothing stores and inventories), but also the rights to the 
“Sigrid Olsen” mark, goodwill, as well as Ms. Olsen’s right of publicity in her name as 
related to the mark.151 
 
145. Id. 
146. See Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan, 512 F. Supp. 2d 559, 574 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (“While there is no 
absolute or inalienable right to use one’s surname in business, regardless of the likelihood of confusion, there 
is ‘an appropriate judicial reluctance to preclude an individual’s business use of his own surname when such is 
honest and straightforward, with no attempt to confuse the public.’” (quoting Sardi’s Rest., 755 F.2d at 725)). 
147. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 34 cmt. g (1995) (emphasis added). 
148. As far as can be determined, other than selling oneself into slavery, the only other properties 
considered inalienable in the United States are body parts removed from living humans. See infra notes 283–
92 and accompanying text for a discussion concerning slavery. See also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
793 P.2d 479, 492–97 (Cal. 1990) (analyzing patient’s ownership interest in his cells after they have been 
removed from his body). As stated in Justice Arabian’s concurrence, John Moore, the plaintiff whose removed 
cancerous body part was used to create a cell line that was sold to other institutions, 
has asked us to recognize and enforce a right to sell one’s own body tissue for profit. He entreats us 
to regard the human vessel—the single most venerated and protected subject in any civilized 
society—as equal with the basest commercial commodity. He urges us to commingle the sacred 
with the profane. He asks much. 
Id. at 497 (Arabian, J., concurring). 
149. Levitt Corp. v. Levitt, 593 F.2d 463, 468 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 85.2(d)(1) (3d ed. 1969)).  
150. These include, among others, Evan Picone, Ralph Lauren, Gianni Versace, Donna Karan, Yves 
Saint Laurent, and Liz Claiborne. 
151. Eric Wilson, Her Forced Retirement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at G1. Liz Claiborne has since 
stopped selling clothing under the “Sigrid Olsen” name, yet will not return the mark to Ms. Olsen. It is 
doubtful that the terms of the contract prohibit Ms. Olsen from taking advantage of Section 45 of the Lanham 
Act by reclaiming the mark based on abandonment. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“A mark shall be deemed to 
be ‘abandoned’ . . . [w]hen its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use. Intent not to 
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However, the enforcement of express assignments of the rights to one’s Personal 
Name Mark—regardless of whether there is a claim of likelihood of confusion—has 
been part of case law since as early as the 1888 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
decision in Russia Cement Co. v. Le Page.152 Le Page was a manufacturer of liquid 
cement who sold his business to Russia Cement. The sales contract expressly stated 
that Le Page sold “the right to use the trade-marks belonging to or in use by” the 
company, including a product called “Le Page’s Liquid Glue.”153 When Le Page started 
selling a product called “Le Page’s Improved Liquid Glue,” Russia Cement sought to 
enjoin Le Page from selling products which contained Le Page’s name under a breach 
of contract claim.154 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the injunction 
granted by the trial court, recognizing that, while “[e]very one has the absolute right to 
use his own name honestly in his own business for the purpose of advertising it,”155 it 
was “also true that one may so sell or part with the right to use his own name as a 
description or designation of a manufactured article as to deprive himself of the right to 
use it as such, and confer this right upon another.”156  
The 1959 Illinois appellate decision in Poorman v. Julian157 displayed the courts’ 
acknowledgment of using the freedom of contract rationale for enforcing agreements in 
which a business owner has sold the right to use his Personal Name Mark. However, 
the court emphasized the requirement that selling the exclusive right to use one’s name 
in connection with a business had to be unambiguously stated in the agreement.158 
 
resume may be inferred from circumstances. Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of 
abandonment.”); see also Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 46 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Congress wanted a mark to 
be deemed abandoned once use has been discontinued with an intent not to resume within the reasonably 
foreseeable future.”).  
152. 17 N.E. 304 (Mass. 1888). 
153. Russ. Cement, 17 N.E. at 306. 
154. Id.  
155. Id. at 305. 
156. Id. The court emphasized that 
[o]ne who has carried on a business under a trade name, and sold a particular article in such a 
manner by the use of his name as a trade-mark or a trade name as to cause the business or the article 
to become known or established in favor under such name, may sell or assign such trade name or 
trade-mark when he sells the business or manufacture, and by such sale or assignment to conclude 
himself from the further use of it in a similar way. A person may be enjoined, therefore, from using 
his own name as a description of an article of his own manufacture, and from selling the article 
under that particular name when he has parted with the right thus to apply it. It is not upon the 
ground of the invasion of the trade name adopted by another, but by reason of the contract he has 
made, that he is deprived of the right himself to use his name as all others of the same name may use 
theirs.  
Id. at 305–06 (citations omitted). As noted in Guth v. Guth Chocolate Co., this premise has been frequently 
affirmed by the courts. 224 F. 932, 933 (4th Cir. 1915) (“‘Where one has used his own name as a trade-name, 
and then parted with it, he may, of course, be enjoined from using his name in that business.’” (quoting Royal 
Baking Powder Co. v. Royal, 122 F. 337, 346 (6th Cir. 1903)). The later case of Levitt Corp. v. Levitt affirmed 
that, “[t]o protect the property interest of the purchaser, . . . courts will be especially alert to foreclose attempts 
by the seller to ‘keep for himself the essential thing he sold, and also keep the price he got for it.’” 593 F.2d 
463, 468 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting Guth, 224 F. at 934). 
157. 160 N.E.2d 169 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959). 
158. Poorman, 160 N.E.2d at 172; see also Karsh v. Haiden, 260 P.2d 633, 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) 
(“The right to use one’s own name in business may be given up by contract, but in the absence of express 
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At issue was the language in the 1949 purchase agreement between William 
Poorman and Walter Julian concerning the sale of Julian’s right, title, and interest in 
their business partnership.159 The parties owned and operated a funeral home business 
as partners under the name “McAllister-Julian-Poorman.”160 The agreement included 
the sale of “all of Julian’s ‘rights to the use of the name McAllister-Julian-Poorman or 
any one name or combination thereof.’”161 The agreement also contained a non-
competition clause, whereby Julian was to “refrain from engaging in such business 
within twenty-five miles of the firm’s place of business for five years.”162  
After the five-year restricted period had expired, Julian and another funeral 
director named Collins Y. Sundberg began to use the name “Walter R. Julian” in some 
ads in connection with Sundberg’s business.163 Poorman sued for an injunction, 
arguing that the agreement gave him exclusive use of the name, even beyond the 
expiration of the restriction.164 Julian countered that it would be unreasonable for the 
court to find that he could practice his trade as an undertaker at any time and anywhere 
during the restriction, but was forevermore prohibited from using his name in 
connection with such a business without express language stating such.165 The trial 
court denied relief.166 On appeal, the appellate court of Illinois upheld the lower court, 
reasoning that, for a court of equity to enjoin the use by a natural person of his own 
name, there must be “a grant to someone else of the exclusive right to use it. This 
exclusive right must be found in the final agreement of the parties by the use of the 
word ‘exclusive’ or the intent of the parties to grant an exclusive right must be 
manifest.”167 The court concluded that, since the agreement was unambiguous in its 
terms and did not specifically give Poorman “exclusive” use of the name ‘McAllister-
Julian-Poorman’ (or any combination thereof), Julian was not prohibited from using his 
own name in connection with the undertaking business after the restricted period had 
ended.168 
With regard to the ability to sell the rights to one’s Personal Name Mark, the 
appellate court of Illinois declared: 
 The right of a natural person freely to use his own name in connection 
with his own business (in the absence of any fraudulent or wrongful 
intention or act) is so fundamental that an intention to entirely divest himself 
of such right and transfer it to another will not readily be presumed but must 
 
language to that effect the intention to part with that right will not be presumed.”); cf. S. Scrap Material Co. v. 
Smith, 44 So. 2d 754, 755 (Ala. 1950) (holding that when there is express contract between parties where 
tradename is licensed for specified period of time, “the right to its use as licensee expires when the contract 
covering its use terminates”).  
159. Poorman, 160 N.E.2d at 170.  
160. Id.  
161. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 170–71. 
164. Id. at 170. 
165. Id. at 173. 
166. Id. at 170. 
167. Id. at 172. 
168. Id. at 173. 
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be clearly shown; where it is so shown the transaction will be upheld; but it 
will not be sustained upon doubtful or uncertain proof. 
 This right . . . like most other property rights, may be the subject of sale 
and transfer, and where a party, by contract, sells out an established business, 
and with it his own name, to be used in connection with such business, the 
buyer will acquire a right to the use of the name, and the seller cannot 
afterwards resume it in carrying on the same business,—such conclusion 
resting upon the contract itself and being within the old doctrine and 
principle that a title based on a sale for a valuable and adequate 
consideration, fairly entered into between parties sui juris, will be upheld, 
and enforced in equity as well as at law.169  
The court also noted that, under Illinois law, the operator of a funeral parlor had to state 
the name of the owner in any advertisement,170 and it was unreasonable that, should 
they conclude that Julian had sold the exclusive right to use his name, he could engage 
in the undertaking business within the parameters of the non-competition clause “yet be 
barred from doing so because the statute says he must use his name in connection 
therewith.”171 The court concluded that this “would cause an undue and unnecessary 
hardship on Julian” and was greater “than that necessary to protect [Poorman].”172  
In Madrigal Audio Laboratories, Inc. v. Cello, Ltd.,173 the Second Circuit 
reiterated the principle that, under contract law “[w]hether a person who sells the trade 
name rights to his personal name is barred from using his personal name depends on 
the terms of the sale.”174 At issue in Madrigal was whether “an individual who sold the 
right to use his personal name as a trade name may be enjoined from advertising the 
fact that he is now connected” with a competing company.175 During the 1970s, Mark 
Levinson built a reputation as the designer of sophisticated audio equipment through 
his business Mark Levinson Audio Systems (MLAS).176 After experiencing financial 
difficulties, Levinson gave up management control of his company and entered into an 
employment agreement with an investor who took control of the management of the 
company.177 Levinson entered into an employment contract with MLAS.178 Under the 
terms of that agreement, if Levinson ever ceased working for MLAS, “he would not 
thereafter use or permit the use of the name ‘Mark Levinson,’ ‘Mark Levinson Audio,’ 
 
169. Id. at 172 (citations omitted); see also Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Hazelton Tripod Boiler Co., 30 N.E. 
339, 345 (Ill. 1892) (finding unless evidence unambiguously shows owner intended to divest himself of right 
to use own name, courts will allow owner to use own name in connection with own business); Frazer v. Frazer 
Lubricator Co., 13 N.E. 639, 642–43 (Ill. 1887) (concluding that where person contracts not to use his name in 
competing business, he should be bound by his agreement).  
170. Poorman, 160 N.E.2d at 173 (citing to Ch. 111 ½, Ill. Rev. Stats. (1957) par. 73.8a). 
171. Id. at 173. 
172. Id. The court seems to be implying that even if it did conclude that Julian had sold the exclusive 
right to use his name in connection with the funeral parlor business, it could construe such an assignment 
clause as constituting an unconscionable or illegal contract, or an unlawful restraint of trade. 
173. 799 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1986). 
174. Madrigal, 799 F.2d at 823. 
175. Id. at 821. 
176. Id. at 816. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
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or any other name including ‘Mark Levinson’ in the name or trademark of any 
corporation engaged in a business similar to that of MLAS.”179  
In 1984, after his relationship with MLAS soured, Levinson left the company, and 
shortly thereafter MLAS went into bankruptcy and all assets, including the rights to the 
aforementioned trade name, were purchased by Madrigal Audio Laboratories, Inc. 180 
In the meantime, Levinson founded another audio equipment manufacturing company 
called Cello, which advertised itself in promotional brochures as being affiliated with 
Levinson.181 In 1985, Levinson was enjoined from using the promotional brochures or 
the Levinson trademark or trade name, based on trademark infringement under the 
Lanham Act as well as common law unfair competition.182 Madrigal was not satisfied 
with the injunction, and sought to prevent Cello from communicating with dealers, 
customers or journalists in the high-end audio industry in compliance with the 
employment agreement’s non-competition clauses.183 The Special Master appointed to 
the case concluded that “Levinson’s conduct violated Madrigal’s right to the Levinson 
trade name and trademark and recommended that Levinson and Cello be barred from 
publicizing Levinson’s connection with Cello” in any manner.184 The district dourt 
accepted the Special Master’s recommendations; Levinson and Cello appealed,185 and 
the Second Circuit reversed.186 The appellate court found that, under the terms of the 
sale, Levinson “did not sell or forfeit his right to use his own personal name as long as 
he did not use it as the trade name of another business.”187  
Thus, these early cases of Russia Cement, Poorman and Madrigal held that based 
on freedom of contract, a purchaser may acquire from the seller rights that extend 
beyond those obtained through trademark law, as long as what is sold is explicitly 
stated in the agreement.188 
In the past decade, the trend has been for purchasers to include contract clauses 
that increase restrictions on the seller’s ability to trade under his or her name or engage 
in any public use, even when 1) such activity is unrelated to any goods or services, 2) 
the name is used in a different market, or 3) there is no likelihood of confusion.189 As 
noted previously, freedom of contract doctrine has allowed for individuals to negotiate 
 
179. Id. at 816–17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
180. Id. at 817. 
181. Id. Specifically, Cello marketed its audio equipment with labels and brochures stating “Cello by 
Mark Levinson” and contained several photographs of him. Id. 
182. Id. at 817–18. 
183. Id. at 820. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 825. 
187. Id. at 823. 
188. A fourth case completes the story; in Levitt Corp. v. Levitt, William J. Levitt refused “to abide by 
the bargain he struck when he sold his business” by continuing to use his name in connection with the 
construction of residential homes. 593 F.2d 463, 466 (2d Cir. 1979). The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision to uphold the likelihood of confusion and breach of contract claims 
and the imposition of an injunction and monetary damages that went beyond the liquidated damages clause in 
the sales agreement. Id. at 465–70. 
189. See infra notes 219–25 for examples of recent contractual provisions.  
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the sale of these otherwise lawful uses of their name even when there would be no 
likelihood of confusion or dilution issues regarding the additional rights transferred.190 
However, these earlier cases dealt with situations where the contract terms 
encompassed activities directly related to the business sold. 
Several recent cases—most involving clothing designers—illustrate the extent to 
which the courts are enforcing agreements by which individuals who have created 
goodwill in their names have contracted away the right to use their names in 
commercial enterprises that extend beyond their chosen profession. 
The case of JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud191 in 2008 asks, “What does $65.5 
million get you?” After developing his reputation over the course of twenty-five years 
by working as a designer for Louis Boston, Southwick, and Polo Ralph Lauren, the 
fashion designer Joseph Abboud (“Abboud”) launched his menswear line under the 
label bearing his name, which was manufactured and sold through a joint venture called 
JA Apparel.192 Abboud registered his personal name as a trademark with the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office. Through a joint venture named JA Apparel, to 
which the “Joseph Abboud” trademarks were licensed, Abboud’s company, 
Houndstooth, and GFT International began to manufacture, market, and sell various 
products under the Joseph Abboud brand name.193 In 1996, GFT bought out Abboud’s 
interest in the joint venture and JA Apparel became a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
GFT.194 New licensing agreements for the “Joseph Abboud” trademarks were issued, 
though the products manufactured, marketed and sold under the mark continued to be 
approved by Abboud.195 
In 2000, Abboud sold “all of [his] right, title, and interest”196 to his intellectual 
property rights in his trademarked name. In return for a $65.5 million payment to 
Abboud, JA Apparel, now wholly owned by GFT, received: 
 The names, trademarks, trade names, service marks, logos, insignias and 
designations . . . and all trademark registrations and applications therefore, 
and the goodwill related thereto . . . and all other Intellectual Property (as 
hereinafter defined). 
. . . . 
 All rights to use and apply for the registration of new trade names, 
trademarks, service marks, logos, insignias and designations containing the 
words “Joseph Abboud,” “designed by Joseph Abboud,” “by Joseph 
Abboud,” “JOE” or “JA,” or anything similar to or derivative thereof, either 
 
190. See supra notes 152–87 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial enforcement of 
contracts that sell a person’s right to use his or her name in connection with a business. 
191. 591 F. Supp. 2d 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). On June 10, 2009, the Second Circuit vacated the district 
court’s decision on the grounds that the agreements’ use of the term “name” as used in the agreement was 
ambiguous regarding whether it referred to Abboud’s name in any context or merely its use as a mark, and 
remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings. JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 568 F.3d 390, 
397–99, 403 (2d Cir. 2009). 
192. JA Apparel Corp., 591 F. Supp. 2d at 311. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 312. 
195. Id.  
196. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 
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alone or in conjunction with other words or symbols . . . for any and all 
products and services. 
. . . . 
 The goodwill of or pertaining to the Trademarks.197 
In addition, the parties entered into a joint venture whereby, for a period of five 
years, Abboud would provide to JA Apparel “consulting services relating to fashion 
design and brand promotion of products sold under the Abboud marks.”198 The 
agreement, set to expire on July 13, 2005, included a two-year non-compete clause (the 
“Restricted Period”), whereby Abboud would not compete with JA Apparel until July 
13, 2007.199 Under the terms of the clause, Abboud was prohibited from 
directly or indirectly, through any partnership, corporation, limited liability 
company, trust or other entity, be associated as an owner, director, officer, 
employee, consultant or other participant with, any person, group, business 
enterprise, or other entity which is engaged in or proposes to engage in the 
business of designing, licensing, manufacturing, marketing or distributing 
any products or services which are or would be competitive with the 
business of [JA Apparel] as then conducted or as such business may 
reasonably be expected to be conducted in the future anywhere in the 
world.200  
The agreement also required Abboud to receive written permission from JA 
Apparel if, during the Restricted Period, he wanted to become associated, “‘in any 
capacity with any person, group, business enterprise or other entity’ that competed 
with, or could be expected to compete with, JA Apparel in the future.”201 Shortly after 
the sale Abboud returned to the company as part of a joint venture, but left for good in 
2005 over differences with the company’s president.202 
Prior to the expiration of the restricted period, Abboud began planning another 
clothing line called “jaz” and engaged in prohibited activities.203 JA Apparel filed suit, 
charging trademark infringement, unfair competition, and violation of the restrictions in 
the sales agreement.204 JA Apparel claimed that, 
while Abboud [was] free to compete in the menswear market, he sold all 
rights to use his name in connection with goods and services, and that his 
proposed uses of his name in connection with the “jaz” line violate[d] the 
Agreement because they [were] plainly “similar” to or “derivative” of the 
names, trademarks, and designations he expressly sold.205  
Abboud countered that he “did not sell the exclusive right to use his name for all 
commercial purposes”206 and could continue to associate his name with another 
 
197. Id. (emphasis added). 
198. Id. at 313. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id.  
202. J.W. Childs Associates, a private equity firm, now owns the apparel company. Id. at 314. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 315. 
205. Id.  
206. Id.  
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clothing line as long as it was not used as a mark and did not cause customer 
confusion.207  
The district court held that the agreement was unambiguous as to the term “name” 
and Abboud conveyed more than merely trademarks, service marks and licensing 
agreements.208 It found that “Abboud sold, conveyed, transferred, assigned, and 
delivered to JA Apparel all of his right, title and interest to the use of his personal 
name, in addition to the trademarks, trade names, and designations containing his 
name, for commercial purposes.”209 The district court granted a permanent injunction, 
preventing Abboud from using his name in connection with advertising both his new 
clothing line as well as with any other goods or services.210 According to the court, 
Abboud’s use of his name in connection with his “jaz” clothing line violated the terms 
of the agreement.211 
The district court held that Abboud could compete with JA Apparel,212 “make 
media appearances as himself [Joseph Abboud, the individual], or as a fashion 
expert,”213 and as “a philanthropist or fashion commentator, if those appearances are 
unrelated to the promotion or sale of goods and services.”214 Abboud could not, 
however, “capitalize on his name, and the goodwill associated with it, in connection 
with the marketing and sale of goods and services to the consuming public;” “sell, 
market, or otherwise promote, goods, products, and services to the consuming 
public;”215 or make media appearances “to promote goods and services in competition 
with Plaintiff.”216 The court also ordered Abboud to refrain from using his name as 
well as any trademarks or trade names which incorporated his name in business, 
including its use on clothing tags or labels, or anything that includes, is similar to, or a 
derivative of “Joseph Abboud,” “by Joseph Abboud,” “designed by Joseph Abboud,” 
“a new composition by Joseph Abboud,” or “by the award-winning designer Joseph 
Abboud.”217 The Second Circuit later held that the term “name” as used in the 
agreements was ambiguous regarding whether it referred to Abboud’s name in any 
context or merely its use as a mark; however, it did not dispute the district court’s 
 
207. Id. at 328–29. 
208. Id. at 324–27. 
209. Id. at 326. 
210. Id. at 326–27, 335. 
211. Id. at 326–27. In addition, the court found that Abboud’s descriptive fair use defense regarding the 
trademark infringement allegation failed because the use of his name in the manners proposed—while 
indicating Abboud as the source of goods—was likely to cause customer confusion. Id. at 331. “[T]he 
distinction between the goodwill associated with the name and the goodwill associated with the trademark has 
been blurred in the eyes of the consumer.” Id. at 333. 
212. Id. at 325. 
213. Id. at 325. 
214. Id. at 337. JA Apparel conceded that once the restricted period ended it could not stop Abboud from 
personally presenting new lines/brands in stores, personally discussing his new line/brands, or negotiating 
agreements with potential licensees. Id. at 316. 
215. Id. at 337. 
216. Id. at 325. 
217. Id. at 326–27, 331, 349. 
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underlying reasoning that if "name" included any context, Abboud would have given 
up more than merely its use as a mark.218  
Based on the fair bargaining of the terms of Abboud’s agreement and under the 
freedom of contract doctrine (and assuming Abboud did in fact give up the use of his 
name in any context), the restrictions may seem reasonable. The terms do not appear to 
enter the realm of illegality or be against public policy. But what if the agreement went 
further? 
V. ON THE ROAD TOWARDS COMPLETE ALIENABILITY OF ONE’S NAME 
In 1999 when clothing designer Sigrid Olsen sold her business to Liz Claiborne, 
Inc., the purchase agreement did go further—in addition to selling the physical assets 
of the business and her IP rights (including her right to publicity), Ms. Olsen was 
completely prohibited from designing clothing until 2010.219 In addition, under the 
terms of the sale, Olsen cannot market clothing under her name even past the expiration 
of the non-competition clause.220 In other words, the clothing designer has sold the 
right to ever associate herself with clothing design.221  
Other contracts for the sale of businesses have gone even further. Some recent 
contracts have included clauses which provide for: (1) indefinite prohibitions on any 
use of the seller’s name—or derivation or likeness—to indicate any connection or 
affiliation with, or ownership of, any other commercial business;222 (2) indefinite 
prohibitions on the seller using her name to endorse, promote, or otherwise draw 
attention to any other commercial business;223 (3) indefinite prohibitions whereby the 
seller cannot take any action to connect herself with any other business or products in 
the minds of consumers;224 (4) and clauses indefinitely prohibiting the use of the 
seller’s name in a commercial setting—either personally, or as a trademark, trade name 
or otherwise—which is unrelated to the purchasing company.225 It is questionable as to 
whether it is good public policy to enforce agreements whereby the seller—such as 
Sigrid Olsen—would spend the remainder of her livelihood toiling in anonymity. 
Even if we reach the conclusion that these contract prohibitions are acceptable, 
suppose the agreements went one step further and provided for restrictions on the 
seller’s personal behavior. This sale of the rights to one's personal behavior can be seen 
as analogous to a morals clause in a celebrity’s endorsement contract as a cause for 
 
218. JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 568 F.3d 390, 399 (2d Cir. 2009). 
219. Wilson, supra note 151. 
220. Id. 
221. She will only be able to practice her profession in anonymity. And even though Liz Claiborne 
closed Olsen’s former company in 2007, it retained the mark and the non-compete clause is still in force. Id. 
Whether Olsen can resume her mark should Liz Claiborne be deemed to have abandoned it is not known. 
Olsen gave up the right to use her name via contract; she may not be able to regain it even if abandoned. 
However this possible situation is not relevant to our discussion.  
222. Confidential contract negotiations on file with author. 
223. Confidential contract negotiations on file with author. 
224. Confidential contract negotiations on file with author. 
225. Confidential contract negotiations on file with author. 
LIEBESMAN_NON-FINAL_WORD 11/30/2010 5:33:59 PM 
2010] PERSONAL NAME MARKS 31 
 
termination of that contract.226 We must question whether the freedom of contract 
doctrine should extend to allowing personal behavior to be negotiated for sale, based on 
the potential effects that some behavior may have on the value of the mark. 
For example, if Ms. Olsen was arrested for a DUI or was found to be running an 
illegal dog-fighting operation, these actions could be viewed as tarnishing the value of 
her Personal Name Mark even though they involve Olsen’s private activities and her 
personal reputation. One could argue that, under broadly prohibitive contract terms, 
these actions would be a breach of the terms which prohibited her from damaging the 
mark through her private activities. But we must consider whether these restrictive 
terms should be allowed, or whether we should consider them as violative of public 
policy because they enter too far into a person’s private realm. And if we determine 
that public policy should allow for such contract terms, we must then determine what 
remedies should be available to parties in the position of Liz Claiborne. At the time of 
the purchase, it may be difficult for the buyer of the Personal Name Mark to quantify 
the damage caused by various prohibited activities.227 
In considering the right to bargain away the rights to one’s name, whereby the 
purchaser controls increasingly more private aspects of the seller’s life, it is necessary 
to examine whether there may be a point at which a fundamental inalienability would 
trump the seller’s freedom to contract.  
On one hand, there is an abundance of examples where a person’s private actions 
have affected an individual’s reputation, and either enhanced or diminished the brand 
value of that person’s name.228 One might argue, therefore, that some individuals are so 
 
226. It is easy to see an analogy for this kind of agreement in the sale of a personal name mark to morals 
clauses in endorsement contracts. We recently witnessed their effect on Tiger Woods, who—while he did not 
sell his personal name mark—has/had endorsement contracts for various products, many of which were ended 
after his multiple extramarital affairs came to light in the media. Most likely, his contracts contained morals 
clauses, which if breached would give the sponsor the right to terminate the contract, and in some instances 
receive liquidated damages. Jim Edwards, Tiger Woods' Endorsement Deals Are Toast, BNET.COM (Dec. 9, 
2009), http://www.bnet.com/blog/advertising-business/tiger-woods-8217-endorsement-deals-are-toast/3743 
(“Morals clauses are standard contract terms that allow advertisers to renege on their deals with celebrities if 
the stars behave badly and ruin their ad plans—as Tiger has done.”); Gatorade Drops Tiger Woods Product, 
FOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 8, 2009), http://entertainment.blogs.foxnews.com/2009/12/08/gatorade-terminates-
partnership-with-tiger-woods/; Kate Stanhope, Tiger Woods Loses Second Endorsement Deal, TVGUIDE.COM 
(Dec. 19, 2009, 12:05 PM), http://www.tvguide.com/news/tiger-woods-loses-1013241.aspx. In the case of 
Woods, “[n]ot only does it affect Tiger, it affects the entire industry. When celebrities do things that negatively 
affect a corporate deal, the legal terms typically end up more in the corporation’s favor the next time.” 
Edwards, supra (internal quotation mark omitted).  
227. Perhaps Liz Claiborne would have to include a liquidated damages clause because of the 
indefiniteness of determining lost profits. See generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981) 
(“Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount that is 
reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of 
loss.”). 
228. For example, after it was publicized that Martha Stewart was under investigation for insider trading 
of her shares in the pharmaceutical company ImClone, stock in Stewart’s self-named corporation plunged from 
around $19 per share on June 6, 2002, to $9.60 per share three weeks later; it reached an all-time low of $6.29 
per share in August 2002. Historical Prices for Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia Inc. (MSO), YAHOO! 
FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=MSO&a=9&b=19&c=1999&d=5&e 
=26&f=2009&g=d&z=66&y=1716 (last visited Sept. 17, 2010); see also Greg Farrell & Bruce Horovitz, Stock 
Troubles Threaten Stewart's Image, USATODAY.COM (June 25, 2002), 
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famous that they are inextricably tied to the value of their Personal Name Mark, 
thereby supporting the need for total alienability (since any negative actions—even 
private ones—could dilute the mark’s value). On the other hand, selling all rights to 
one’s name, including the named individual’s personal use and private behavior, could 
be viewed as a Faustian soul-selling bargain.229  
In considering whether such contracts impermissibly encroach on our notions of 
“personhood,” or whether individuals should be permitted to voluntarily surrender what 
were once considered inalienable rights, it is useful to think of the variety of limitation 
options on a spectrum. At one end, permissible contract clauses could be limited to 
those which would encompass only the use of one’s name for the mark which had been 
purchased. At this end, the limit would be barely above the point of prohibitions 
against use in the same market such as fraud (using what had been sold),230 causing 
customer confusion,231 trademark infringement, or unfair competition.232 At the other 
extreme is the total sale of all rights, almost to the point of selling oneself into 
slavery.233 
 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/covers/2002-06-25-martha.htm (discussing decline in value of Martha 
Stewart Living Omnimedia stock). In October 2002, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia Inc. reported declines 
in revenue of about 40% from the previous year due to the scandal. Martha Stewart Scandal: A Tempest in a 
Cuisineart, SAVE MARTHA!, http://id3464.securedata.net/savemartha/martha_stewart_trial_when.html (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2010). The drop in revenue continued through Ms. Stewart’s 2004 indictment and conviction, 
and she lost nearly half of her net worth as a result. Stewart Convicted on All Charges, CNNMONEY.COM 
(Mar. 10, 2004, 1:51 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2004/03/05/news/companies/martha_verdict/. After she 
finished serving her five-month prison sentence in early 2005, however, she was able to rehabilitate her brand 
and the stock rose to the $25–$30 per share range by July 2005. Historical Prices for Martha Stewart Living 
Omnimedia Inc. (MSO), supra. 
 In another example of a person’s celebrity value dropping, after rapper Chris Brown’s violent assault on 
his then-girlfriend, singer Rihanna, Brown was forced to withdraw scheduled performances at the 2009 
Grammy Awards and NBA All-Star Basketball game. Laura Schreffler & Oren Yaniv, Chris Brown Sought by 
Police in Battery Investigation, NYDAILYNEWS.COM (Feb. 8, 2009), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/gossip/2009/02/08/2009-02-08_chris_brown_sought_by_police_in_ 
battery_.html#ixzz0KcEfJOIZ&C. In addition, Brown has lost endorsements, radio stations have stopped 
playing or reduced airtime for his songs, and it has likely affected sales of his songs and his career. Gil 
Kaufman, Will Radio Stations Stop Playing Chris Brown?, MTV.COM (Feb. 11, 2009, 2:46 PM), 
http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1604845/20090211/brown__chris__18_.jhtml; Shaheem Reid, Chris 
Brown’s Sentence: What Effect Will It Have on His Career?, MTV.COM (June 23, 2009, 2:53 PM), 
http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1614517/20090623/brown__chris__18_.jhtml; Simon Vozick-Levinson, 
Chris Brown and Rihanna: More Fallout, EW.COM (Feb. 10, 2009, 10:12 PM), 
http://hollywoodinsider.ew.com/2009/02/10/chris-brown-and/.  
229. See JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, GOETHE’S FAUST 70–71 (John Anster, trans., 1909) (where 
protagonist, Faust, sells soul to devil for unlimited knowledge and worldly pleasures).  
230. See, e.g., Russ. Cement Co. v. Le Page, 17 N.E. 304, 305–07 (1888) (enjoining party from using his 
last name as a mark when it had previously been assigned to manufacturer). 
231. See, e.g., Levitt Corp. v. Levitt, 593 F.2d 463, 469 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding confusion existed 
between plaintiff’s and defendant’s respective enterprises). 
232. See, e.g., Sardi’s Rest. Corp. v. Sardie, 755 F.2d 719, 725 (9th Cir. 1985) (requiring confusion of 
marks in proving unfair competition). 
233. See infra notes 283–92 and accompanying text for a discussion on contracting and slavery. 
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A. Limitations on Professions that the Seller May Practice 
Moving away from the far edge of the range where the agreed-upon limitations 
are the least restrictive,234 the first point to discuss is the argument that it is acceptable 
to allow contract clauses which place indefinite limitations on the professions the seller 
may practice, whereby the seller agrees to an unlimited lifetime ban on practicing her 
trade. This form of prohibition appears to fall under well-settled law regarding 
restraint-of-trade issues with regard to the sale of a business:235 
That contracts in general restraint of trade are generally held to be illegal is 
beyond controversy. But the rule admits of well-defined exceptions, and 
among the exceptions are contracts . . . where the limitation as to territory is 
reasonable, and there exists a legal consideration for the restraint, are valid 
and enforceable in equity, and in such cases relief by injunction is customary 
and proper.236  
Courts generally hold that restraints on trade will be enforced if there are 
reasonable geographical limitations imposed.237 On point to our discussion, Missouri 
courts have upheld an expansive geographic restriction on the use of a Personal Name 
Mark when associated with the sale of a business.238 In 1975, Schnucks, the successor 
in interest to Allied Supermarkets, sued Joseph Bettendorf for violation of the terms of 
a 1958 sales agreement between Bettendorf and Allied.239 In that sales agreement, 
Bettendorf promised not to engage in the grocery business within a 200-mile radius of 
St. Louis for ten years after the sale, and would “not at any time after the [sale] directly 
or indirectly engage in such business or any business involving the manufacture, 
distribution or sale of food products within said area under the name Bettendorf, or any 
combination thereof.”240 The restricted area encompassed a much larger region than the 
actual locations or sphere of influence of Bettendorf grocery stores at the time of the 
sale.241 
 
234. The farthest, least restrictive point on the spectrum—prohibition limited to the use of one’s name as 
related to the goods or services for which the mark had been purchased—is a well-established, acceptable 
contract limitation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995). 
235. It should be noted, however, that “[a]s a general rule . . . covenants not to compete pursuant to the 
sale of a business are not treated as strictly as those whose sole purpose is to limit employment.” Town Line 
Repairs, Inc. v. Anderson, 455 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
236. Ryan v. Hamilton, 68 N.E. 781, 783 (Ill. 1903); see also Bauer v. Sawyer, 134 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ill. 
1956) (“In determining whether a restraint is reasonable it is necessary to consider whether enforcement will 
be injurious to the public or cause undue hardship to the promisor, and whether the restraint imposed is greater 
than is necessary to protect the promisee.”).  
237. See Bauer, 134 N.E.2d at 331 (stating that covenant in medical partnership agreement which bound 
withdrawing doctor from practicing in city was reasonable given modern modes of transportation). But see 
Martinez v. DaVita, Inc., 598 S.E.2d 334, 338 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that Georgia courts assess 
reasonableness of non-compete covenants by “analyzing the covenant's duration, territorial coverage, and 
scope of restricted activity measured against whether the restrictions of the seller protect the purchaser's . . . 
legitimate business interests, the value of the business, and its good will”).  
238. Schnucks Twenty-Five, Inc. v. Bettendorf, 595 S.W.2d 279, 284–86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).  
239. Id. at 282. 
240. Id. at 282–83 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
241. Id. at 282, 286. 
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In 1975, Schnucks filed suit, alleging that Joseph Bettendorf’s use of his name as 
a Personal Name Mark “in connection with the grocery business within a 200 mile 
radius of St. Louis amounted to an appropriation of a property right belonging to 
[Schnucks].”242 The trial court enjoined Bettendorf from using his name, initials (J.B.), 
or their phonetic equivalent (Jay Bee) in connection with the grocery business within 
the geographic restriction.243 Bettendorf appealed, but the Missouri Court of Appeals 
agreed with the lower court, holding that the use of “J.B.” and other derivations of 
Bettendorf’s name within the restricted region amounted to a misappropriation of 
Schnucks’ property244 and was not an unlawful restraint of trade.245 The trial and 
appellate courts rejected Bettendorf’s argument that the 200 mile radius was 
unreasonable,246 reasoning that “[t]he inclusion of a territorial limitation in a covenant 
not to compete was designed to protect the vulnerable business interest of the 
covenantee. If the spatial limitation is found to be reasonable for the covenantee, it is 
usually found to be reasonable visàvis [sic] the public.”247  
However, with regard to restraints of trade that have no time limitations on the 
ban, the situation becomes murky. Several states, either through case law248 or 
legislation,249 prohibit indefinite temporal prohibitions on restraint of trade, while 
others allow it.250 For example, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that—based on 
public policy—individuals who sell their businesses may not be subject to an indefinite 
prohibition on practicing their profession,251 and a similar result was achieved in 
 
242. Id. at 282. 
243. Id. “As part of the consideration for the sale of the Bettendorf stock, appellant, Joseph Bettendorf, 
relinquished his right to use his name or any combination thereof in connection with the grocery business in 
the St. Louis area. There exists ample authority for construing such a covenant as effecting the transfer of a 
property right.” Id. at 285 (citing Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540, 547 (1887); P.H. Schneider 
Brewing Co. v. Century Distilling Co., 107 F.2d 699, 703 (10th Cir. 1939); Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & 
Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 1935)).  
244. Id. at 286. (“Appellants unequivocally covenanted not to use their family name in the retail food 
market within a 200 mile radius of St. Louis [and they could] not now derogate from that grant.”).  
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 282, 286. 
247. Id. at 286. 
248. See, e.g., Three Phx. Co. v. Pace Indus., Inc., 659 P.2d 1271, 1276 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (“[T]he 
effective time of the [non-competition] restriction cannot lawfully be perpetual or indefinite.”), vacated, 659 
P.2d 1258 (Ariz. 1983).  
249. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (LexisNexis 1975); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16601 (West 2009); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.33(2)(a) (West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4(c)(1) (West 2009); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 23:921 (2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 416.031(1) (West 2009).  
250. See, e.g., McCord v. West, 983 So. 2d 133, 140 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that non-compete 
clause was “overly broad in duration” in violation of Louisiana statute limiting such covenants to two years); 
see also Fogle v. Shah, 539 N.E.2d 500, 506 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (indicating that an indefinite temporal 
restriction may be permissible); Town Line Repairs, Inc. v. Anderson, 455 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1982) (same); Barrett-Walls, Inc. v. T. V. Venture, Inc., 251 S.E.2d 558, 561 (Ga. 1979) (same); Ceresia v. 
Mitchell, 242 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Ky. 1951) (same); Oliver v. Rogers, 976 S.W.2d 792, 800–01 (Tex. App. 
1998) (same). 
251. See Bauer v. Sawyer, 134 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ill. 1956) (indicating that indefinite prohibitions have 
been held by some courts as against public policy). 
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Louisiana through legislation,252 but Indiana courts have declared that they recognize 
no such prohibition.253 Thus, depending on the jurisdiction, an unlimited ban on 
practicing one’s trade may run afoul of public policy—and thus be unenforceable—in 
the same manner as any non-competition clause related to the sale of a business.254 
B. A Positive Obligation to Maintain the Value of the Personal Name Mark or a 
Negative Obligation Whereby the Seller Agrees Not to Partake in Activities Which 
Impair the Value of the Asset  
Perhaps the purchaser would prefer a more restrictive clause and constructs the 
agreement so that the seller has an obligation to maintain the value of the Personal 
Name Mark as a warranty. Warranties by a seller that bear a strong resemblance to 
other accepted sellers’ and assignors’ warranties may not be viewed as an overly broad 
limitation, and—depending on the language—may not be considered too vague to 
adequately enforce. The purchaser may insist on positive obligations—that is, the seller 
must perform specific duties—or insist on negative obligations, whereby the seller 
must refrain from certain activities. However, courts are more likely to enforce 
negative obligations through a prohibitory injunction than a positive obligation through 
an order for specific performance or a mandatory injunction.255 
A negative obligation as a transfer condition could be analogized to an assignment 
of rights in a contract to a third party. In an assignment for consideration,256 the 
 
252. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921B (2009) (placing two-year time limitation on restraints that bar 
exercise of lawful profession). 
253. Fogle, 539 N.E.2d at 506 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that indefinite time restraints are not 
necessarily injurious to public policy). 
254. One may inquire as to whether the purchase price makes a difference in the validity of a restraint of 
trade clause. Courts have concluded that it does not. 
[In restraint of trade] cases it is not the business of a court to inquire whether the consideration is 
adequate, or of equal value to that which the party loses by the restriction. In cases of this character 
it is impossible for courts to tell how valuable to the complainant or how injurious to the defendant 
may be the restraint sought to be imposed. It is sufficient to uphold such contracts if the court 
arrives at the conclusion that there is, as a matter of fact, some legal consideration; but the adequacy 
of the consideration is within the exclusive dominion of the parties where they contract freely and 
without fraud. 
Ryan v. Hamilton, 68 N.E. 781, 783 (Ill. 1903).  
255. See BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C. BUSHAW, CONTRACTS: CASES, DISCUSSION, AND PROBLEMS 868-69 
(2nd ed. 2008) (noting that “courts tend to be more conservative in granting mandatory injunctions 
[injunctions that call for positive action or obligation] than prohibitory injunctions”); see also Lumley v. 
Wagner, (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 687, 693 (Q.B.) (noting that while Court did not have ability to compel 
opera singer to sing at specific venue, it could order her to refrain from singing elsewhere). 
256. This is also called an “assignment for value.” See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON 
CONTRACTS 700 (5th ed. 2003) (“[A]n assignment is for value if the assignee parts with consideration . . . .”).  
 An assignment of rights is the transfer of rights under a contract, and occurs in two separate steps. First, 
two parties enter into a contract. Second, one of the parties—the Assignor—later transfers her rights under that 
contract to a third party. See BLUM & BUSHAW, supra note 255, at 891. For example, suppose Starbuck 
contracts with the City of New Caprica, whereby Starbuck agrees to provide security services; Starbuck later 
transfers her rights to be paid under the contract to Apollo. Starbuck is the assignor—she is the party to the 
contract who later transfers rights under the contract to another, called the assignee (who, in this example, is 
Apollo). The assignee was not a party to the contract, but is able to enforce the contract because of the 
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assignor warrants that she will do nothing to impair the value of the assignment.257 
However, it might be a stretch to use an assignment analogy to expand this form of 
restriction so as to include acts of moral turpitude or other personal actions unrelated to 
the sold business assets. 
C. Limitations on Associating Herself in the Public’s Mind with Any Business 
Suppose the seller of the Personal Name Mark agreed to never use her name in 
connection with any other commercial business—for example, through endorsement or 
otherwise drawing attention to another commercial business—to the point where she 
could never take any action to connect herself in the minds of consumers, either 
personally or as a mark, with any other business or product. Taken to an extreme, this 
could prohibit the seller from wearing a shirt with a logo, driving a car, or even eating 
at a restaurant.258 
Courts have long recognized that, when one sells his Personal Name Mark as a 
business asset, the seller 
may have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark outside the 
field of his own exploitation . . . . His mark is his authentic seal; by it he 
vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his name for good or ill. . . . 
[A] reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator . . . . 259  
As an economic interest, the use of a Personal Name Mark outside the field of 
exploitation to which it is currently associated would seem to be alienable, and such a 
contract term on its face would appear to be valid and reasonable. However, to 
contractually prohibit the association in the minds of the public with any business could 
lead to absurd results. For example, under such terms, the seller of the mark could not 
ride in a car (which has the car company’s logo and brand displayed on it), wear a shirt 
for her favorite sports team, or eat at a restaurant, since each of these activities could 
potentially associate the seller with a business in the minds of the public.260 The former 
 
assignment. See, e.g., Cedar Point Apartments, Ltd. v. Cedar Point Inv. Corp., 693 F.2d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 
1982) (holding that assignees have standing to sue as real parties in interest where original contract limited 
“right” to assign but not “power” to assign); BLUM & BUSHAW, supra note 255, at 890. The other party to the 
contract is the obligor, which, in our example, is the City of New Caprica. Id.  
 Consideration is a bargained-for legal detriment. It is in the form of either (i) performance [doing 
something not legally obligated to do]; (ii) forbearance [not doing something legally entitled to do]; (iii) a 
promise to perform; (iv) or promise to forbear. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 71–72 (1981). In 
most contracts, the consideration offered by one party is a monetary payment. However, one promise can be 
consideration for another promise. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1981). The assignor’s 
warranty does not apply to a gratuitous assignment or gift. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 333 
(1981). 
257. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 333 (1981). The assignor, however, only warrants what 
she has done or will do; she does not warrant what the obligor will do. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 71 (1981); see also Lopez v. Puzina, 49 Cal. Rptr. 122, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (finding that 
assignors are not liable upon obligor’s failure to perform).  
258. Celebrities no doubt frequent certain restaurants, drive specific cars, and wear particular designer 
labels as indirect endorsements of those products and services. 
259. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928). 
260. President Obama’s forays to local restaurants have prompted Alex Nicholson of 
BrightestYoungThings.com to create an “Obama Ate Here” Google Map application. Alex Nicholson, Weekly 
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owner of the Personal Name Mark would be confined to living the life of a hermit, 
since any activity which might be viewed by the public could violate such a contract 
term. 
D. Prohibition of Personal and/or Private Activities 
Moving along the spectrum towards increasing alienability, the next point to 
examine is a policy prohibiting total alienation of one’s identity but allowing contract 
clauses that dictate general, or specific, personal/private behavior. Again we must 
consider how much of one’s behavior and one’s right to pursue personal activities may 
be sold before it crosses the line into slavery, and whether selling the ability to control 
one’s behavior and personal activities could even be distinguished from slavery.261 An 
agreement whereby the seller was forbidden from public activities would include 
running for public office. Is civic involvement a right that we should allow to be 
contractually limited, or is it something that should be inalienable?  
It may be difficult to find the limit, without crossing it, whereby what may be sold 
abuts the line where the seller is virtually selling him- or herself into slavery. The 
ability to sell so much of oneself, moreover, may rely on how courts view positive 
obligations versus negative contractual obligations, as well as on a court’s perspective 
of what it is feasible to do with regards to enforcement and monitoring.262 
Perhaps, rather than proscribing specific activities, the agreement contained a 
clause whereby the seller of the Personal Name Mark agreed that her private activities 
would not undermine the value of the asset. One could argue that such a clause is 
impermissibly intrusive into one’s private sphere. Under this line of reasoning, the 
contract language could also be seen as vague and ambiguous and thus unenforceable 
by the courts.263 
A clause by which the seller agreed to avoid tarnishing the mark through her 
private actions, such as a clause which prohibited acts of moral turpitude, could be 
analogized to (1) prohibiting private behavior via employment contracts and employer 
rules/employee handbooks; (2) contract clauses whereby the seller agrees not to impair 
 
Food News Round Up, BRIGHTESTYOUNGTHINGS.COM (July 1, 2009), 
http://www.brightestyoungthings.com/food/weekly-food-news-round-up-21/. The map may be found at 
http://maps.google.com/maps/ms?ie=UTF8&hl=en&msa=0&msid=108964553126950953075. 
00046d95ee780b6d8d757&ll=38.871766,-77.040244&spn=0.090665,0.076878&source=embed. Restaurants 
where the President eats have been the beneficiaries of increased sales. Jim Rutenberg, Rearranging the Tables 
in Washington: Can Obama’s Coattails Reach to Restaurants? N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, at D1. And, as 
another example of a celebrity being attached to a brand by the press, Britney Spears’ car is a source of news 
for the paparazzi. Brit: White Mercedes, Orange Soda, Pink Eye, TMZ (Oct. 12, 2007), 
http://www.tmz.com/2007/10/12/brit-white-mercedes-orange-crush-pink-eye/ (discussing Brittany Spears—
who at the time was suffering from conjunctivitis—driving her white Mercedes to gas station where she 
purchased Sunkist Orange soda).  
261. As noted earlier, a contract which provides for an unlimited period of servitude is unenforceable as 
violative of public policy. See Parsons v. Trask, 73 Mass. (1 Gray) 473, 478 (1856) (describing contract with 
unlimited period of servitude as “against the policy of our institutions and laws”).  
262. Cf. Everett V. Abbot, Keener on Quasi-Contracts II, 10 HARV. L. REV. 479, 494–95 (1897) 
(explaining that courts are less likely to impose positive duties than negative duties).  
263. One could also argue that it would be equally difficult if would-be clauses prohibited the seller from 
engaging—or required the seller to engage—specific activities. 
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the value of the asset; or (3) warranties in a contract assignment for value, whereby the 
assignor warrants that he will not do anything to impair the value of the assignment. 
Employment contracts and handbooks, even those for “at will employment,” 
sometimes contain prohibitions on non-work related behavior, which would tend to 
support an argument that similar prohibitions in a sale of a Personal Name Mark would 
be permissible. Under “at will” employment,264 an employee may be fired for any 
reason as long as the termination is not for an illegal reason or a reason that violates 
public policy,265 even for behavior that occurs outside of the job. For example, in 2005, 
a Miller Beer truck driver in Wisconsin was terminated when caught drinking a 
Budweiser at a bar on his day off.266 
However, employees have often successfully countered bans on legal off-hours 
activities based on a reasonable expectation of privacy for off-the-job conduct.267 Such 
claims find support in case law under several common law tort theories for claims of 
invasion of privacy based on the intrusion upon an employee’s seclusion,268 as well as 
state and federal statutes.269 This would run counter to sanctioning a similar clause in 
the sale of a Personal Name Mark. 
In her article on employment rights regarding off-duty conduct, Marisa Ann 
Pagnattaro discusses the limited use of the common law tort of invasion of privacy as a 
means of redress.270 Pagnattaro identified Section 652B of the Restatement (Second) of 
 
264. The at-will employment doctrine  
recognizes an employer's right to discharge “for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally 
wrong[.]” . . .  
. . . [P]arties to an at-will employment contract enter into the contract with full knowledge that the 
employment is for an indefinite duration and can terminate at the will of either party. . . . for any 
reason or no reason. 
Shoppe v. Gucci Am., Inc., 14 P.3d 1049, 1063–64 (Haw. 2000) (first alteration in original) (quoting Parnar v. 
Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 628 (Haw. 1982)).  
265. See id. at 1064–66 (discussing limits to at-will employment doctrine). 
266. Dustin Block, He Had a Bud Light; Now He Doesn't Have a Job, JOURNAL TIMES (Feb. 11, 2005), 
http://www.journaltimes.com/news/local/article_4fec718c-fbf5-5c63-ab08-a466b6d40c51.html. 
Unsurprisingly, the local Anheuser-Busch distributor thought this was grossly unfair. Id. (“We hate to see 
anybody get let go who’s enjoying a nice cold Bud Light on his own time. . . . We don’t think it’s fair to the 
individual to be fired based on what he was drinking.”). However, in a slightly more reasonable scenario, a 
Coca-Cola driver in California was fired after being witnessed drinking a Pepsi while wearing his Coca-Cola 
uniform during a delivery stop. Coca-Cola justified the firing based on its employee manual whereby the 
employee agreed not to slander the company’s products. The Cola Wars Get Personal: Coke Employee Fired 
for Drinking Pepsi on the Job, CNNMONEY.COM (June 16, 2003), 
http://money.cnn.com/2003/06/13/news/funny/coke_pepsi// 
267. See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are Not At Work?: Limiting the Use of 
Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 629–30 
(2004) (explaining state positions on protection for employees’ off-duty conduct and court-created expectation 
of privacy for off-the-job conduct).  
268. Id. at 631–37. 
269. Id. See generally Terry Morehead Dworkin, It’s My Life—Leave Me Alone: Off-The-Job Employee 
Associational Privacy Rights, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 47 (1997) (presenting several statutory challenges to 
employers' encroachments upon employee privacy rights); Jason Bosch, Note, None of Your Business 
(Interest): The Argument for Protecting All Employee Behavior with No Business Impact, 76 S. CALIF. L. REV. 
639 (2003) (discussing lifestyle protection statutes enacted to protect employee privacy rights).  
270. Pagnattaro, supra note 267, at 630–40. 
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Torts as a basis for such actions, whereby “‘[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically 
or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or 
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.’”271 Several states have legislatively 
restricted the ability to terminate an employee for conduct that takes place outside of 
work. In 1992, the state of New York prohibited the firing of an employee based on 
legal activities outside of work.272 Other states with similar “lifestyle discrimination” 
laws include California,273 North Dakota,274 and Colorado,275 although the latter two 
have exceptions for activities that may create a conflict with the employer’s interests.276 
Other states have various levels of statutory protection for off-duty conduct.277 
Both common law and statutory privacy expectations could be balanced against 
an employer’s legitimate interests in investigating off-duty conduct.278 For example, 
courts have upheld the termination of police officers who had been involved in fights279 
or engaged in so-called “disreputable activities”280 while off duty. This “legitimate 
business” carve-out could be used to rationalize a ban on the seller from engaging in 
private behavior that could injure the value of the Personal Name Mark. 
While the purchaser of a Personal Name Mark could make a nonfrivolous 
argument that certain behavior by the seller would adversely affect his or her ability to 
fully exploit the mark, courts in jurisdictions with strong employee “off-duty activity” 
 
271. Id. at 631 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1965)).  
272. NY LAB. LAW § 201-d (McKinney 2009). 
Unless otherwise provided by law, it shall be unlawful for any employer . . .  to refuse to hire, 
employ or license, or to discharge from employment or otherwise discriminate against an individual 
in compensation, promotion or terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of: a. an 
individual's political activities outside of working hours, off of the employer's premises and without 
use of the employer's equipment or other property, if such activities are legal , . .  b. an individual's 
legal use of consumable products prior to the beginning or after the conclusion of the employee's 
work hours , . . . c. an individual's legal recreational activities outside work hours , . . .  d. an 
individual's membership in a union . . . .  
Id. 
273. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 96(k), 98.6 (West 2003).  
274. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-01 et seq. (2004). 
275. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1)–(2) (2009). 
276. Stephen Keyes, Can Employees Be Fired for Off-Duty Smoking or Other Lawful Consumer 
Activities Outside of Work? (It Depends on What State They're In), EMP. L. COUNS., May 2007, available at 
201 EMPL. L. COUNS. Art. I (Westlaw). 
277. In addition, eighteen states plus the District of Columbia prohibit termination for some or all 
employees for off-duty smoking and other tobacco use during non-working hours. Id. Other states expand this 
to include other lawful products, either generally or specifically, such as alcohol. Id. These statutes, however, 
often contain a “bona fide occupational qualification” exception, such as an employee who worked for the 
American Lung Association that was seen smoking outside of work hours. Id. For an in-depth discussion on 
employee privacy rights and state variations concerning an employer’s ability to fire an employee based on 
off-duty conduct, see Dworkin, supra note 269; Pagnattaro, supra note 267; Bosch, supra note 269. 
278. Pagnattaro, supra note 267, at 680–84.  
279. See Davenport v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs of Peoria, 278 N.E.2d 212, 216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) 
(affirming discharge of officer due to his involvement in fight while off-duty).  
280. See Righter v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of Adrian, 136 N.W.2d 718, 718 (Mich. Ct. App. 1965) 
(upholding termination of police officer who “had been observed visiting a certain single woman . . . ‘at such 
hours and in such a manner as to bring discredit upon the police department’”).  
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protections could find that similar clauses in the Personal Name Mark sales agreements 
are unenforceable based on the same privacy considerations. If terminations based on 
private activities are against public policy in the employment context, one could 
reasonably argue that the same is true for similar prohibitions incorporated into 
Personal Name Mark assignments. 
Even if clauses in assignment contracts that restrict private activities are 
enforceable, the question arises as to how one would enforce such a provision, or seek 
remedies for a breach. In both the sale of the Personal Name Mark and employment 
circumstances, the seller/employee has received consideration (financial gain and a job, 
respectively) in return for agreeing to the terms of the sale or terms of employment. 
However, while an employer may terminate an employee who does not abide by 
company policy,281 no such remedy is available to the new owner of the Personal Name 
Mark. Damage to goodwill may be difficult to assess, and a liquidated damages clause 
may not be enforceable if it assigns too high a value caused by a breach.282 In order for 
these forms of restrictions to be valid contractual transfers of rights, courts would most 
likely construe such clauses narrowly, and only consider such restrictions valid if the 
parties could demonstrate adequate enforcement and monitoring mechanisms which did 
not place an undue burden on the court. 
E. Completely Selling One’s Identity 
In the outer limits of the spectrum one would argue that there should be no 
limitations as to how much may be sold; that everything—every aspect of one’s 
identity—is alienable.283 Supporting the sale of one’s identity is our strong public 
policy in this country to avoid restraints on the ability to sell, gift or otherwise transfer 
private property.284 As a brand, one’s name has thus become property capable of 
transfer.285 
Restraints upon alienation are not favored by the law. The modern rule is 
that one may do what he will with his own, unless prohibited by a positive 
statute or restrained by manifest public policy. The principal value of 
property inheres in the right to sell it, and all property is presumed to be 
salable and assignable, unless its sale or assignment is clearly forbidden.286  
 
281. See, e.g., Lugo v. Milford Mgmt. Corp., 956 F. Supp. 1120, 1129 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (upholding 
termination of security guard for violation of company policy which forbade working while intoxicated). 
282. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981) (indicating unreasonably large liquidated 
damages are unenforceable on grounds of public policy). 
283. One could consider this end of the spectrum as the libertarian position—that is, supporting 
complete self-ownership whereby one owns oneself as a person just as one can fully own any inanimate 
object—along with, and all rights associated with, such ownership, including the right to transfer ownership to 
others. Libertarianism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/libertarianism/.  
284. See, e.g., RTS Landfill, Inc. v. Appalachian Waste Sys., LLC, 598 S.E.2d 798, 802 (Ga. Ct. App., 
2004) (“[R]estraints on alienation of personal property are disfavored.”); LaFond v. Rumler, 574 N.W.2d 40, 
42 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (“Michigan follows the common-law rule against unreasonable restraints on 
alienation of property.”).  
285.  See supra Part II.D for a discussion of the commercial value associated with a name and the ability 
to transfer this value.  
286. Fish Bros. Wagon Co. v. Fish Bros. Mfg. Co., 95 F. 457, 461 (8th Cir. 1899). 
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Still, it may be elusive to find the point prior to where one would be selling his 
fundamental right “to be known as a particular individual,”287 and would thus not be 
selling that which is unsellable. Beyond constitutional issues,288 it has long been held 
that one of the limitations on freedom of contract is one’s ability to sell oneself into 
slavery. In his seminal essay On Liberty,289 John Stuart Mill expounded on this 
limitation. He first noted that, under what we now call the freedom of contract doctrine, 
the liberty of the individual, in things wherein the individual is alone 
concerned, implies a corresponding liberty in any number of individuals to 
regulate by mutual agreement such things as regard them jointly, and regard 
no persons but themselves. This question presents no difficulty, so long as 
the will of all the persons implicated remains unaltered; but since that will 
may change, it is often necessary, even in things in which they alone are 
concerned, that they should enter into engagements with one another; and 
when they do, it is fit, as a general rule, that those engagements should be 
kept. 290  
However, Mill recognized that “in the laws, probably, of every country, this 
general rule has some exceptions. Not only persons are not held to engagements which 
violate the rights of third parties, but it is sometimes considered a sufficient reason for 
releasing them from an engagement, that it is injurious to themselves.”291 As an 
example of such an exception, Mill explained why individuals may not sell themselves 
into slavery: 
In this and most other civilized countries . . . an engagement by which a 
person should sell himself, or allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be 
null and void; neither enforced by law nor by opinion. The ground for thus 
limiting his power of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life, is apparent, 
and is very clearly seen in this extreme case. The reason for not interfering, 
unless for the sake of others, with a person’s voluntary acts, is consideration 
for his liberty. His voluntary choice is evidence that what he so chooses is 
desirable, or at the least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best 
provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it. But by 
selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future 
use of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the 
very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. 
He is no longer free; but is thenceforth in a position which has no longer the 
presumption in its favour, that would be afforded by his voluntarily 
remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be 
free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his freedom. 
These reasons, the force of which is so conspicuous in this peculiar case, are 
evidently of far wider application; yet a limit is everywhere set to them by 
 
287. Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 758 (D. Conn. 1935).  
288. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or 
any place subject to their jurisdiction.”). But see Nathan B. Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2020, 2023 (2009) (“[I]n most situations [court enforcement through] specific 
performance of a personal service contract does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment.”).  
289. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 5 (John Gray ed., 1991).  
290. Id. at 113. 
291. Id. 
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the necessities of life, which continually require, not indeed that we should 
resign our freedom, but that we should consent to this and the other 
limitation of it.292  
Thus, the use of a personal name as a mark does not terminate its separate 
function “as a symbol of that individual’s personality, reputation and 
accomplishments.”293 It is most likely impossible to completely disconnect a person 
from their personal identity through contract, as it would require the Herculean task of 
divorcing that connection from the minds of the public. It is not possible to enforce the 
contract against the general public and thus prevent others from continuing to refer to 
the seller by her former identity. It is questionable whether it is sound public policy to 
allow for such contract clauses to be enforced because—through no fault of the seller—
others could continue to identify her by her former name, and no action on her part 
would be successful in ending such use. It would be impossible for the purchaser to 
attempt to enforce such a restriction against the general public, making the contractual 
name change meaningless. 
F. Future Discussions 
Issues raised by the sale rights tangential to one’s Personal Name Mark extend 
beyond what may be discussed in a single article. Further dialogue is needed as to 
whether there is a reciprocal obligation; that is, whether the purchaser of the Personal 
Name Mark has an implied duty to maintain the seller’s reputation in their name. 
In addition, we must also consider whether consumers have an expectation that 
the person behind the name is “still back there,” as well as whether customer 
expectations should also be taken into account—that is, whether there is a social 
interest in not allowing complete disassociation with one’s name. We must also 
consider to what extent the individual consumer is affected by the sale of a Personal 
Name Mark. The public may expect that the originator of the Personal Name Mark is 
still associated with the product bearing her name.294 Also to be addressed is the social 
 
292. Id. at 113–14 (emphasis added). See generally Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the 
Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5 (1971). Gerald Dworkin notes that, while Mill objects to governmental 
paternalism to interfere with an individual’s liberty, Mill also justifies “some paternal interferences. . . . to 
preserve a wider range of freedom for the individual in question”—a position which relies “on the absolute 
value of choice itself.” Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION: BASIC ISSUES IN 
MEDICAL ETHICS 407 185, 191 (Ronald Monson ed., 1979).  
293. Madrigal Audio Labs., Inc. v. Cello, Ltd., 799 F.2d 814, 822 (2d Cir. 1986); see generally Margaret 
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). 
294. For example, the book series supposedly authored by VC Andrews and Carolyn Keene (the Nancy 
Drew series) are in fact penned by others, and clothing designer companies bear their name long after the 
originator ceases being associated with the brand. Nevertheless, such distinctions may be lost on many 
consumers. As noted supra, in notes 191–218 and accompanying text, Joseph Abboud and Sigrid Olsen are no 
longer involved in the products that bear their name, yet the public may continue to believe that they are, and a 
non-frivolous claim could be made that to advertise using the designer’s name is a form of false advertising if 
the public continues to believe that the designer is “still behind the label.” When JA Apparel recently launched 
a new “JOE Joseph Abboud” line of clothing, the corporation did not indicate that Abboud was no longer 
associated with his Mark. JOE Joseph Abboud to Launch at JCPenny This Fall, REUTERS.COM, (Apr. 16, 
2009, 10:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUS141385+16-Apr-2009+BW20090416. This dilemma is 
illustrated in JCPenney’s statement regarding the alliance with JA Apparel, that “[i]n response to the emerging 
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harm in not allowing the public to benefit from the skills of a person who has been 
prohibited—through contract—from practicing her trade. 
Future discussions should also look at situations where the seller is involuntarily 
divested of her Personal Name Mark, such as through bankruptcy or divorce.295 While 
the mark itself may be involuntarily transferred, we must look for the boundaries of 
those tangential rights attached to the mark that may also be divested as a component of 
the transfer, or if there are any duties that may be attached to an involuntary sale, such 
as a duty to maintain the value of the mark. We can see hints of such issues through the 
scholarship on the involuntary transfer of one’s right of publicity. In 1993 when Kim 
Basinger filed for bankruptcy protection, her creditors sought ownership of her name, 
including the right to “exercise control over whether or not Basinger should accept 
particular acting roles and forced disclosure of any plans Basinger had to have a 
baby.”296 O.J. Simpson was at one point in a similar predicament when his former in-
laws and the Goldman family sought to acquire his publicity rights to satisfy their civil 
judgment against him for the death of their daughter.297 However, the Superior Court of 
California denied Goldman’s motion, holding that “neither the law, nor the limits of 
[the] court’s equity jurisdiction, support outright transfer of a judgment debtor’s inter 
vivos right of publicity.”298 
 
need of men seeking well-known, high-quality brands, we are . . . making a renowned designer brand 
accessible to the moderate consumer at an incomparable value.” Id. In this instance, the average consumer 
might reasonably infer that Joseph Abboud (the person) is still associated with his clothing line. It could be 
argued that, as a matter of public policy, the new owner may have a duty to disclaim affiliation with the 
originator of the Personal Name Mark if such an affiliation is likely to continue after the transfer of the mark.  
295. Problems with such a transfer are briefly discussed in Westfall & Landau, supra note 78, at 107-09. 
Those authors note that requiring that a celebrity’s right of publicity be sold to a third party through 
bankruptcy “violate[s] the strong, and perhaps constitutionally undergirded, public policy against forced labor 
if the . . . third party has the power to force the celebrity to appear in commercials or other promotions.” Id. at 
107. The authors argue that, it would be “difficult to find a basis, in either divorce or bankruptcy law, to 
support requiring a spouse to perform services after divorce for the holder of her rights of publicity.” Id. at 
107–08. The article also briefly notes that if a celebrity’s right of publicity is given to a third party in the 
course of a bankruptcy proceeding, the celebrity could conceivably be liable “for various highly personal 
actions . . . (like poor on-screen performance or a divorce) that sharply reduce the value of her publicity 
rights.” Id. at 115.  
296. Campbell, supra note 82, at 180. Breach of contract damages awarded in a lawsuit that precipitated 
the bankruptcy filing were overturned on appeal. Consequently, there was no resolution in the courts as to 
whether Ms. Basinger could lose control over her right of publicity through a forced bankruptcy sale, and 
whether her actions as related to her right of publicity could be controlled by a creditor. Id. at 204. 
297. Notice of Motion and Motion by Plaintiff Frederic Goldman for Order Transferring and Assigning 
Right of Publicity of Defendant and Judgment Debtor Orenthal James Simpson; Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support at 1, Goldman v. Simpson, No. SC 036340 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2006); Associated 
Press, Ron Goldman’s Family Seeks O.J. Simpson’s Publicity Rights, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, at 6. 
298. Goldman v. Simpson, No. SC 036340, slip op. at 13 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2006). 
Although assignable during lifetime, and thus bearing at least one characteristic of a property right, 
the nature of the publicity right during the lifetime of the celebrity is equally characterized by 
privacy rights which mitigate against court-enforced transfer of the right to obtain commercial profit 
from his or her likeness. . . . [T]here are critical distinctions between the nature of the inter vivos 
right of publicity, and its post mortem survival. . . . 
Id. at 9. The court noted that “to base transfer of the right of publicity upon the post-judgment inequitable 
conduct of the judgment debtor ‘celebrity’ raises substantial procedural—if not constitutional issues—
involving due process rights to further hearing upon the equity issues, etc.” Id. at 12. The court also lists other 
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However, this fails to answer the question of whether the Personal Name Mark 
when voluntarily separated from the named person, may extend to any tangential rights 
associated with the mark as discussed in this Article. Therefore, any future dialogue 
should consider whether distinguishing between unintentional and intentional transfers 
should have an effect in the limitations of the former owner’s use of her name. 
Finally, further discussion is warranted regarding how judicial interpretation of 
the above discussed clauses via objective principles of construction would influence 
their validity.299 Doctrines of contract construction would influence a finding of the 
validity and enforceability of the clause in question.300 A judge would also likely 
consider how the complexities of monitoring, administering and enforcing any court-
fashioned remedy for a breach would weigh when determining the validity of the 
restrictive clause in question. 
VI. FINAL THOUGHTS 
While most intellectual property attorneys would advise their clients to avoid 
naming their company after themselves,301 egos and other considerations continue to 
have businesses so named, and such advice often arrives after the enterprise is already 
in existence. This seemingly unremarkable decision to self-name one’s business has 
opened up a Pandora’s box in terms of the intermingling of the person with the 
Personal Name Mark, and the compromise of personal liberties that may occur 
 
problems with such a transfer, including the court’s ability to audit and monitor credits against judgment, 
whether the assignee has a fiduciary duty for prudent decision-making, and the effect of licensing and 
infringement suits against third parties. Id. at 7–8. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer 
Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1322 (2002). The Goldman family did eventually gain control over Simpson’s book, “If I did It,” 
changing the title to “I did It.” Charles Montaldo, Goldmans Buy Rights to O.J. Simpson’s Book, ABOUT.COM 
(July 4, 2007), http://crime.about.com/b/2007/07/04/goldmans-buy-rights-to-ojs-book.htm; Patrick Oppmann 
and Susan Candiotti, O.J.'s Book Proceeds Will go to Goldman Family, CNN.COM (July 30, 2007, 09:29 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/07/30/simpson.book/index.html?iref=storysearch.  
299. See City of Phila. v. Phila. Transp. Co., 26 A.2d 909, 912 (Pa. 1942) (stating five principals of 
contract interpretation). 
 In interpreting [a contract] provision, five principles of construction should be kept in mind. The 
first is that the entire contract should be read as a whole and every part interpreted with reference to 
the whole, so as to give effect to its true purpose[.] The second is that “the contract itself must be 
read in the light of the circumstances under which it was made” and that it is necessary to “consider 
the situation of the parties at that time, the necessities for which they naturally provided, the 
advantages each probably sought to secure and the relation of the properties and rights in regard to 
which they negotiated.” The third is that where a public interest is affected, an interpretation is 
preferred which favors the public[.] The fourth is that specific provisions ordinarily will be regarded 
as qualifying the meaning of broad general words in relation to a particular subject[.] And the fifth 
is that, unless contrary to the plain meaning of the contract, an interpretation given by the parties 
themselves will be favored[.]  
Id. (citations omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §203(a) (1981) (“[A]n interpretation 
which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which 
leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect . . . .”). 
300. See generally Phila. Transp. Co., 26 A.2d 909. 
301. As discussed supra note 17, a mark that is primarily a surname is a weak mark, and not one that is 
immediately registerable on the Principle Register.  
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tangentially to the sale of the mark. While freedom of contract should dictate no limits, 
as discussed above, this is not an option.302 And it’s usually a bad idea to sell one’s 
soul or other essentials deeply associated with the person. 
John Stuart Mill noted that any interference with an individual’s liberty is 
governmental paternalism,303 and we must carefully consider whether the chosen 
limitation smacks of an overbroad use of the state’s paternalistic power.304 However, 
[s]ince we are all aware of our irrational propensities, deficiencies in 
cognitive and emotional capacities and avoidable and unavoidable ignorance 
it is rational and prudent for us to in effect take out “social insurance 
policies.” We may argue for and against proposed paternalistic measures in 
terms of what fully rational individuals would accept as forms of protection . 
. . . [but there] are certain kinds of conditions which make it plausible to 
suppose that rational men could reach agreement to limit their liberty . . . .305  
Yet it is not paternalism that provides for so-called government “interference” 
with contracting parties. Contracts are created with the assumption that the government 
will enforce them though its judicial branch.306 And as such, doctrines on what a court 
is willing and unwilling to enforce plays a role in any private ordering between parties. 
One must wonder how a court would possibly enforce the selling of one’s soul, or 
whether it would force the seller to live as a hermit rather than be associated with any 
brand in the eyes of the public. No bright line is likely to be drawn on a spectrum of 
what may or may not be sold in conjunction with one’s Personal Name Mark. 
However, it may be possible to provide guidance for what is—and is not—possible, as 
well as open the discussion concerning whether what can be done should be done. 
 
 
302. See supra Part III for a discussion of restraints on the freedom of contract.  
303. MILL, supra note 289, at 113 (“It is only because the institutions of this country are a mass of 
inconsistencies, that things find admittance into our practice which belong to the system of despotic, or what is 
called paternal, government . . . .”).  
304. Dworkin, supra note 292, at 191 (noting that we already have some “principles governing the 
acceptable use of paternalistic power in cases where it is generally agreed that it is legitimate”).  
305. Id. at 192. “The difficulty is in specifying in advance, even vaguely, the class of cases in which 
intervention will be legitimate.” Id. at 194. Indeed, individuals often want the thrill of adventure that comes 
with “ultra-hazardous activities . . . e.g. mountain-climbing,” which we would not want subject to state 
intervention. Id. “There are some risks—even very great ones—which a person is entitled to take with his 
life.” Id. at 194–95.  
306. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (“A contract is a promise or a set of 
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way 
recognizes as a duty.”). 
